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Abstract
In the paper, I argue that the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause grants
Congress the power to enact statutes to protect liberty. I trace the American con-
cept of liberty, using archival research, through the writings of the revolutionary
framers and abolitionists. I believe that the Thirty-Eighth Congress, 1864-1865,
intended the Thirteenth Amendment to provide the power to enforce the Declara-
tion of Independence’s and Preamble’s guarantees of equal liberty. The paper also
places the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment into the contempo-
rary setting of recent decisions on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause.
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2Introduction
he enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to guarantee 
liberty by appropriate legislation.1 The clause is founded on the Preamble’s guarantee of a 
national government that is committed to protecting civil liberties for the general welfare. 
Congress, however, has rarely exercised its power under the Thirteenth Amendment. Instead, the 
enforcement clause remains a rarely used constitutional provision, and its reach remains little 
understood.
Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence is also an underdeveloped area of law with 
enormous potential. The Supreme Court has determined the Thirteenth Amendment to be much 
more than an emancipation law. Pursuant to the Amendment, Congress can enact legislation that 
prohibits private discrimination in housing,2 education,3 and employment.4 Some scholars, too, 
have realized that the Thirteenth Amendment covers everything from labor practices5 to hate 
1
 The Thirteenth Amendment provides: 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
2
 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3
 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
4
 Peonage and racist employment practices are both prohibited by federal legislation. See
Anti-Peonage Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867). Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) (“[t]he 
undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti-peonage Act was not 
merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor throughout 
the United States”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) (“compulsion of such 
service by constant fear of imprisonment under the criminal laws” violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (finding a compulsory statute to 
work off debt to be an unconstitutional form of peonage which violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment). See also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Importance of Section 1981, 
73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 601-02 (1988) (discussing the relationship of employment race 
discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (holding that 
remedies under Title VII and § 1981 are “separate, distinct, and independent”).
5
 Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 437, 440 (1989) (stating that “[i]n addition to purely labor-based concerns, the Thirteenth 
Amendment debates reflected themes such as racial equality, the importance of access to 
education, the integrity of families, and the natural rights of mankind”); James G. Pope recently 
T
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3speech.6 No one, however, has carefully elaborated the perimeters of liberty covered by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.
The heritage of the Amendment is grounded in liberty and equality principles that 
flourished among antislavery and abolitionist activists during the American Revolution and 
before the Civil War. Their perspectives on individual rights within a constitutional republic 
shaped the dialogue of congressmen who debated passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. The 
social and legal aspirations of Radical Republicans, whose principled stand against slavery was 
indispensable to the Amendment’s ratification, were never realized after the 1877 presidential 
abandonment of Reconstruction.7
The nineteenth century and early-twentieth century Court further intruded on Congress’s 
ability to use its Thirteenth Amendment power to end widespread, racist practices. The Court of 
that period only recognized congressional enforcement power to prevent overtly forced labor.8
wrote about the labor movement’s decision to base labor rights activism on the Commerce 
Clause instead of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce 
Clause: Labor & the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (2002).
6
 Akhil R. Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendment: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 124, 157 (1992) (asserting that hate speech is a badge of servitude).
7
 The Compromise of 1877 was an agreement between Democrats and Republicans to 
give Rutherford B. Hayes, rather than Samuel J. Tilden, the presidential election of 1876. In 
exchange, Hayes withdrew federal troops from the South. Thereby, what remained of 
Reconstruction, became unraveled. Concerning the regressive effect of the Compromise on civil 
rights efforts see GEORGE H. HOEMANN, WHAT GOD HATH WROUGHT: THE EMBODIMENT OF 
FREEDOM IN THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 160 (1987). G. Sidney Buchanan, a legal historian, 
examined the effects of the Compromise of 1877 on judicial decisions, finding that they extended 
further than the immediate congressional abandonment of Reconstruction legislation. The 
Supreme Court, too, having sent the key member to the election committee, began determining 
opinions in line with the Compromise of 1877. Subsequent Court decisions became more averse 
to federal civil rights jurisdiction, until the Thirteenth Amendment was a hollow guarantee, 
remaining practically unenforceable. G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal 
History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 367 (1974). From 1877, the Court 
began using the Constitution to avoid the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Hall 
v. DeCuir,  95 U.S. 485 (1877) (finding Louisiana violated the Commerce Clause by requiring 
the desegregation of public conveyance).
8
 For decades after it rendered segregationist opinions like Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court 
rendered the Thirteenth Amendment a dead letter in all but peonage cases. See Anti-Peonage Act, 
14 Stat. 546 (1867). Justice Brewer defined peonage “as a status or condition of compulsory 
service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basal fact is indebtedness.” 
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905).  See also Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 
(1944) (“[t]he undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment as implemented by the Anti-peonage 
Act was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
4The Justices further undercut the purposes of Radical Reconstruction. The Court, for instance, 
found that Congress lacked the power to protect citizens’ fundamental rights under the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The narrow distinction between state and 
federal powers eventually gave way to the judicial and legislative protections of private liberties.
These precedents led to Congress’s resort to the Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 and 
the Commerce Clause to enact contemporary civil rights statutes. Several recent opinions have 
diminished Congress’s ability to rely on these two traditional sources for civil rights initiatives. 
The Rehnquist Court limited Congress’s power to address state violations of the Equal Protection 
and Due Process Clauses to legislation that is responsive.10 The Court also diminished 
Congress’s ability to penalize discriminatory conduct pursuant to its Commerce Clause power to 
regulate private conduct. Congress may now only use the latter power when it is acting to 
regulate an economic enterprise that substantially affects interstate commerce.11
labor throughout the United States”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) 
(“compulsion of such service by constant fear of imprisonment under the criminal laws” violates 
the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (finding a compulsory 
statute to work off debt to be an unconstitutional form of peonage which violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment).
9
 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873) (interpreting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply only to the rights of national 
citizenship). The Slaughterhouse Cases, drew a distinction between national and state 
citizenship. Id. at 73-74 (1873). The Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges and 
immunities of federal citizenship, and Article IV protects the privileges and immunities of state 
citizenship. Federal privileges and immunities arose from citizens’ relation to the federal 
government, while state privileges and immunities arose from fundamental rights that are 
essential to a free society. Justice Miller’s majority opinion determined that the privilege of 
working in the vocation of one’s choice or traveling is not one that the federal government can 
affect but is at the sole discretion of state governments. See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
521-22, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10
 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, in part, because it found the statute “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent 
unconstitutional behavior.” 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997). The case limited Congress’s section 5 
powers to passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee. Id. at 520 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s history confirms the remedial, rather than 
substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.”) The Court reiterated this “responsive” standard 
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, which limited Congress’s power to extend the applicability 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state actors. 528 U.S. at 86. See also Board of 
Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001); Nev. Dept Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721, 728-29 (2003); Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 1981 (2004).
11 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (determining that 
congressional commerce power does not extend to gender-motivated violence); United States v. 
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5The recent cases have not diminished Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement 
power.  It grants Congress the power to provide national protections for an expansive range of 
fundamental rights. The Amendment’s founders aimed to vest Congress with the power to assure 
liberty to the utmost reaches of the Preamble and Declaration of Independence. Congressional 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority is not limited to responsive enactments, as is the 
Fourteenth Amendment; neither is the applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment limited to state 
actors.12 The Thirteenth Amendment, unlike the Commerce Clause, grants Congress the power to 
end human rights abuses, regardless of their economic impact.13
This article draws upon the views of the country’s founders, abolitionists, and Radical 
Republicans to focus on the broad ranging implications of the Thirteenth Amendment. It explains 
how the Thirteenth Amendment protects persons against arbitrary treatment that obstructs their 
liberty rights. In the Congress’s and the judiciary’s continued neglect of the Amendment lies the 
practical failure of the advocates of freedom. The article is predominantly theoretical; I have 
dealt with practical implications of the Thirteenth Amendment elsewhere.14 The enforcement 
clause provided Congress with the power to provide for individual liberties and the general 
welfare that the Preamble and the Declaration only spoke of in idealistic terms.
I begin with an overview of the congressional debates on the proposed amendment. They 
took place near the end of the Civil War, in 1864 and 1865, and give perspective to the 
Amendment’s radical aims. The Amendment’s framers sought to enforce the goals of liberty that 
the Revolutionary founders embraced but failed to include in the Constitution. After considering 
the Radical’s constitutional expectations, I examine the concept of liberty as it was set out in 
revolutionary literature and then in abolitionist writings. Next, I show how Supreme Court 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (concluding that Congress failed to demonstrate that the 
possession of handguns in a local school zone was an economic activity).
12
 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibiting a private school from 
discriminating against parents who wanted to enroll their children); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968) (affirming the Civil Rights Cases finding that the Thirteenth 
Amendment bans all "badges and incidents of [servitude]"); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
20 (1883) (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited state and private badges of 
servitude).
13 See ALEXANDER TSESIS, THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT & FREEDOM: HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
LEGAL THEORY ch. 6  (2004) (distinguishing between the Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce 
Clause).
14
 Alexander Tsesis, Regulating Intimidating Speech, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGISLATION 389 
(2004) (regarding the Thirteenth Amendment and the regulation of hate speech); Alexander 
Tsesis, Furthering Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B. C. L. REV. 307 
(2004) (concerning the relation of the Thirteenth Amendment to other parts of the Constitution); 
Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75 
TEMPLE L. REV. 539 (2002) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment grants federal government 
the power to prohibit states from using Confederate symbols in official state logos).
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6precedent and statutory law remain substantively gaunt. I conclude with an analysis of the 
Amendment’s meaning within the context of recent jurisprudence.
I. Congressional Debates on the Proposed Amendment
Soon after Ohio Representative James M. Ashley introduced the proposed Thirteenth 
Amendment in Congress,15 President Abraham Lincoln gave a speech in Baltimore on the 
uncertain nature of freedom. On April 18, 1864, the President observed that: 
The world has never had a good definition of liberty, and the American people, 
just now, are much in need of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the 
same word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty may 
mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; 
while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please 
with other men, and the product of other men’s labor. Here are two, not only 
different, but incompatible things, called by the same name, liberty.16
Members of the Thirty-eighth Congress, who debated on passing the proposed Thirteenth 
Amendment, did much to dispel this paradoxical vagueness.
Supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment had a principled understanding of liberty. Even 
though their debates sometimes amounted to no more than political rhetoric, they constituted an 
essential part of a public debate aimed at persuading fellow congressmen and the newspaper 
reading public.17 Their speeches were often filled with a penetrating understanding of human 
rights that had seemingly eluded the founding generation with its concessions to slavery.18 In 
15
 Ashley introduced the proposal on December 14, 1863, during the 38th Congress, 
announcing his intent to submit an amendment “prohibiting slavery, or involuntary servitude, in 
all of the States and Territories now owned or which may be hereafter acquired by the United 
States.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1863).  In the Senate, John Henderson of 
Missouri introduced the proposal on January 13, 1864. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 
(1864).
16 Quoted in William L. Westermann, Between Slavery & Freedom, 50 AM. HIST. REV.
213, 213 (1945).
17
 Richard L. Aynes, Refined Incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 289, 298 (1999) (mentioning that congressional debates, such as the one on Reconstruction, 
were reported in both the Congressional Globe and local newspapers).
18
 The original Constitution contains several compromises that the Philadelphia 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 made to the supporters of slavery: The Three-Fifths Clause 
reduced blacks to three-fifths the value of whites for purposes of representation, the Fugitive 
Slave Clause prohibited non-slaveholding states from emancipating runaway slaves and required 
their return to slave owners, and the Slave Importation Clause countenanced the African slave 
trade to continue until 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, partly repealed by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, affected by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; & art. I, § 9, cl. 1 
which lapsed. For a detailed explanation of this point, See Frederick Douglass, The Constitution 
& Slavery, in 1 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Philip 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art9
7retrospect, Isaac N. Arnold, who was a member of the Congress during the Civil War, considered 
the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment to have been “the most important in American history. 
Indeed it would be difficult to find any others so important in the history of the world.”19 The 
drastic constitutional changes that the Thirteenth Amendment heralded brought into sharp relief 
the original Constitution’s protections of slavery. Even passage of the Bill of Rights failed to put 
an end to that institution.20 To others ending slavery through constitutional amendment was to be 
the logical conclusion of the “old fathers who made the Constitution” because they “fought for 
the rights of human nature, and they believed that slavery was at war with the rights of human 
nature.”21
Debates on an abolition amendment arose at a time when Southern secession had left 
Congress in the hands of members who wished to eradicate institutionalized slavery, which they 
understood to be the origin of the Civil War.22 The Emancipation Proclamation did not 
adequately deal with the problem. Indeed, congressmen and Lincoln recognized that the 
Proclamation was inadequate to eradicate slavery since its legal justification rested on the 
President’s wartime powers which would be ineffectual following the end belligerencies.23 The 
constitutional uncertainties surrounding the Emancipation proclamation gave rise to the political 
resolve to pass a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.24
S. Foner ed., 1950) (first published in The North Star, Mar. 16, 1849); Paul Finkelman, The 
Color of Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 937, 971 (1993); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, SOURCES OF 
ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1760-1848, 62-63 (1977); ALEXANDER TSESIS, THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT & AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY (2004).
19 ISAAC N. ARNOLD, THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 346 (1887).
20
 Representative William D. Kelly, for instance, recognized the founders had 
“compromised with wrong” at the Constitutional Convention. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 
2983 (1864). Even opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment, like New York Representative 
Fernando Wood, saw it as a “change in the fundamental law [and] a material alteration.” CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864).
21 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (1864) (remarks of Rep. John F. Farnsworth 
from Illinois).
22
 Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative & Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
9 NAT’L B.J. 26, 33 (1951).
23
 Ira Berlin, Emancipation & Its Meaning, in UNION & EMANCIPATION: ESSAYS ON 
POLITICS & RACE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 109 (David W. Blight & Brooks D. Simpson eds., 
1997) (discussing Lincoln’s understanding of the limited nature of the Emancipation 
Proclamation because it was based on his military powers as Commander and Chief).
24
 On the decision to strengthen the principles associated with the Emancipation 
Proclamation see HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL 222-23 (1913); J. G. 
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 372-78, 390-91 (rev. ed. 1963); 
DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS & THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
8Sustained debate on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment did not begin until mid-March 
of 1864 and concluded, with its passage, on January 31, 1865.25 During that period, several 
congressmen offered proposed resolutions.26 The most ambitious of these was Charles Sumner’s 
proposal proving that, “Everywhere within the limits of the United States, and of each State or 
Territory thereof, all persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a 
slave.”27 When the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Lyman Trumbull, reported 
language of the joint resolution, it lacked Sumner’s proposed wording on equality.28 This was a 
missed opportunity that would demand passage of another amendment, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which did include an equal protection clause.29
In spite of their shortsightedness on how difficult it would be to secure equality,30 the 
1776 TO THE PRESENT 55 (1991).
25 See passim CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864) to CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 531 (1865).
26
 Beside’s Ashley’s resolution, Radical Representatives James E. Wilson of Iowa and 
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania and Missouri Senator John B. Henderson proposed varying, 
but substantively similar, amendment proposals. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 21(1863); 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1325 (1864). 
Henderson, who was a Democrat, was himself a slaveowner when the Civil War began. His 
support during the Senate debates on the proposed amendment was nevertheless steadfast. He 
recognized that slavery had caused the degradation of blacks’ talents and intellects. See id. at 
1465 (“I will not be intimidated by negro equality. The negro may possess mental qualities 
entitling him to a position beyond our present belief. If so, I shall put no obstacle in the way of 
his elevation.”). Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky unsuccessfully tried to include a clause that 
would have prevented African Americans from becoming citizens and civil and military. CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.1370 (1864).
27 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1864) (emphasis added).
28
 The Committee reported the proposal that would go on to become the Thirteenth 
Amendment on February 10, 1864. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1864). The 
interchange involved Senators Sumner, Trumbull, and Jacob Howard of Michigan. Howard 
mistakenly thought Sumner’s language to be “utterly insignificant and meaningless.” CONG. 
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482-83 (1864). Sumner withdrew his proposal since he considered 
Howard’s views to be based on a sincere commitment to abolition. Id. at 1488.
29
 Many of the Amendment’s supporters seem to have consider the “equality” wording to 
be unnecessary since they believed that the very passage of the Thirteenth Amendment would 
mean that thereafter “all persons shall be equal under the law,” as Representative Elijah Ward of 
New York explained. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1865).
30
 Since the Thirteenth Amendment lacked any explicit recognition of equality, 
Congressmen who opposed granting blacks equal rights could argue that the Amendment was 
never meant to guarantee those rights. Senator Saulsbury, for instance, claimed during the Thirty-
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art9
9thirty-eighth Congress adopted two powerful, though pithy, sections. The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s supporters expected section 2 to enable Congress to secure the benefits of national 
citizenship, including freedom to travel, to labor, and to alienate property.31 The Amendment, 
said Representative Russell M. Thayer of Pennsylvania, in retrospect, was meant to benefit 
freemen with the “great charter of liberty.”32 Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson’s perspective 
that the proposed amendment would guard the “sacred rights” of whites and blacks was typical.33
Philadelphia Representative William D. Kelly sought to establish universal liberty that would 
allow everyone to enjoy the beneficent republican institutions.”34 Slavery chiefly oppressed 
blacks, but it also brought white labor into an abject and servile state that was analogous to the 
condition of black slaves.35
ninth Congress that the Amendment was only meant to affect blacks in slavery and not to make 
them or free blacks in the North and South legally equal to white men. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 
1st Sess. 476 (1866).
31 HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY & FREEDMEN’S 
RIGHTS, 1861-1866, at 120 (1976).
32 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1151 (1866).
33 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
34 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2985 (1864).
35
 The Chairman of Judiciary Committee, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, pointed 
out that, “non-slaveholding whites became alarmed at the bold announcement that ‘slavery is the 
natural and normal condition of the laboring man, whether white or black,’ seeing therein the 
commencement of an effort intended to result in the enslavement of labor instead of the mere 
enslavement of the African race.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). Wilson was 
referring to an editorial from a South Carolina newspaper. The fuller text bode even more 
ominously for white laborers: “The great evil of Northern free society is that it is burdened with a 
servile class of mechanics and laborers unfit for self-government, and yet clothed with the 
attributes and powers of citizens. Master and slave is a relation as necessary as that of parent and 
child; and the Northern States will yet have to introduce it. Slavery is the natural and normal 
condition of laboring men whether white or black.” Quoted in Joseph G. Rayback, The American 
Workingman & the Antislavery Crusade, 3 J. ECON. HIST. 152, 162 (1943). Supporters of the 
proposed Thirteenth Amendment, like Representative Francis W. Kellogg of Michigan, were 
well aware the “leading men of the South” believed that “capitalists of the country should own 
the laborers, whether white or black.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864).
The most popular proslavery advocate of this view was George Fitzhugh who thought a 
northern worker “who contracts to serve for a term of days, months, or years, is, for such term, 
the property of his employer.” CANNIBALS ALL!, OR, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 342 (1857). 
Historian Eugene D. Genovese has pointed out the classist logic of this point: “The notion that 
slavery was a proper social system for all labor, not merely for black labor, did not arise as a last-
minute rationalization; it grew steadily as part of the growing self-awareness of the planter 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Representative Arnold believed that liberty and equality for all citizens would be the 
Amendment’s “great cornerstone.”36 The Amendment was meant to transform American society 
by assuring civil liberty to all economic strata. Everyone, regardless of race or profession, was to 
be an equal before the law.37 For blacks, Radical Republican E. C. Ingersoll proclaimed, the 
Thirteenth Amendment would secure their natural and God-given rights.38 Ingersoll’s ideals were 
somewhat unspecific, as were the views of many of those who participated in the debate on the 
proposed amendment, but he exhibited typical empathy for persons in bondage. Ingersoll, drew 
attention to the inalienable rights of blacks to live in a state of freedom where they could “enjoy 
God’s free sunshine” and the right to reap the benefits of their labor.39 Poor white laborers too, 
Ingersoll believed, would benefit from emancipation since slavery kept them in ignorance, 
poverty, and degredation.40
Such a social transformation could only be achieved where the national government could 
enforce freedom; a mere freeing from bondage would be inadequate. If “freedom” means nothing 
more than liberation from shackles, Representative and future president James A. Garfield 
pointed out in 1865, then it is “a bitter mockery” and “a cruel delusion.”41 For freedom to be the 
class.” THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE 130 (1969).  See also James L. Huston, A 
Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of Protectionist Labor Doctrines, 
70 J. AM. HIST. 35, 38 (1983) (“Southerners eagerly grasped the conclusion of English 
economists that all free labor was destined to live a beggarly existence and wielded this 
prediction like a club against northern defamers of the peculiar institution”); Russell B. Nye, The
Slave Power Conspiracy, 1830-1860, in THE ABOLITIONISTS: REFORMERS OR FANATICS? 107, 
110-111 (Richard O. Curry ed., 1965) (explaining the abolitionist and Republican dissemination 
of information on the Southern perception that white labor was a form of slavery).
36 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989 (1864) .
37
 One of the leaders in the House, James F. Wilson, who chaired the House Judiciary 
Committee, envisioned the new Republic to be a place where persons of humble stations would 
be legally equal to kings and princes. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1319 (1864). Radicals 
hoped the Thirteenth Amendment would improve labor conditions for whites and blacks. The 
Republican party regarded efforts on behalf of a free white labor force to be central for equality. 
The Republicans indicated their commitment in the wording of their 1856 slogan: “Free Speech, 
Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free Territory, and Fremont.” RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS 
FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1837-1860, at 284 (1976). “Free 
labor,” as Eric Foner has pointed out meant not being subject “to the coercions of slavery and 
enjoying the opportunity for physical mobility and social advancement.” Eric Foner, The 
Meaning of Freedom in the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. HIST. 435, 453 (1994).
38 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864). 
39 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864).
40 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (1864).
41
 James A. Garfield, Oration delivered at Ravenna, Ohio July 4, 1865, in 1 THE WORKS 
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triumphal end of slavery,42 the Thirteenth Amendment needed to provide government with the 
power to end all the concomitant detriments associated with the institution. Debates on the 
Thirteenth Amendment indicate that Congress believed that abolition would guarantee newly 
freed blacks and all American citizens with a variety of rights. Freedom would make blacks 
political players in the system that whites had administered since the country’s founding.43
Prohibiting blacks, and other disenfranchised groups, from holding political office violated the 
principles of the Declaration of Independence, Representative Thaddeus Stevens asserted, 
because the government of the United States was never meant to be under the sovereignty of 
races, dynasties, and families.44 The equal right to govern was rather innate to everyone “no 
matter what the shape or color.”45
The proposed amendment was meant to give a practical effect to the Declaration of 
Independence’s self-evident truths “that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their 
creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”46 The Declaration recognized the inalienable nature of civil and religious liberty and 
their centrality in founding a new country. The Thirteenth Amendment granted the missing 
OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale, ed., 1882) .
42 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2618 (1864) (Statement by Mr. Kellogg of New 
York: “That slavery is dead presupposes and assumes that freedom triumphs.”).
43 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 202 (1865). Near the end of the Congressional 
debate, Representative John R. McBride of Oregon addressed fears that emancipation would 
mean blacks would have political franchise. He thought that after liberation the “rights and status 
of the negro [should] settle themselves as they will and must upon their own just basis. If, as a 
race, they shall prove themselves worthy of elective right; they will demand and they will win it, 
and they ought to have it.” Id. While this statement is somewhat equivocal and blacks were not 
granted franchise until the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, McBride envisioned the Thirteenth 
Amendment to be an empowerment for further political accomplishments.
Furthermore, Congress passed the Reconstruction Act of 1867 three years before the 
Fifteenth Amendment was ratified. That Act required Southern states to grant blacks suffrage 
rights. 14 Stat. 428 (1867); Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law 
Affecting Racial & Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 21, 21 (Chandler 
Davidson and Bernard Grofman, eds., 1994); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 277 (1989). Such bold reconstruction power indicates 
that McBride was not the only legislator who thought the Thirteenth Amendment empowered 
Congress to secure political rights. The Fifteenth Amendment put this power, with its limited 
qualification of racial protection, beyond legislative doubt.
44 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1864).
45 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1864).
46 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (Indiana Representative Godlove S. 
Orth).
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federal enforcement power to guarantee that birthright.47 The Amendment’s proponents assumed 
that slavery violated the fundamental principals of social contract, which they regarded as 
binding in spite of the constitutional protections of slavery.48 For them, the Preamble superceded 
the legal sanctions of slavery. Radicals incorporated the moral and political, natural truths of the 
Declaration and the Preamble into the Amendment.49
Many in the Thirty-eighth congress recognized that laws that barred blacks from engaging 
in ordinary business, entering into contracts, and acquiring an education compromised the 
country’s founding principles.50 In spite of their idealistic flourishes, however, few Congressmen 
were willing to grant the reparations that Thaddeus Stevens championed.51
The constitutional change of the Thirteenth Amendment was, nevertheless, much more 
than simply severing the de facto and de jure connections that bound slaves to their masters. As 
Representative Frederick E. Woodbridge of Vermont put it, passing the Amendment assured that 
at the end of the War “the goddess of Liberty . . . . may look north and south, east and west, upon 
a free nation untarnished by aught inconsistent with freedom.”52
Some of the ideals expressed during the congressional debates were visionary and were 
not realized even after the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification. Senator James Harlan of Iowa, 
during the Senate debate of 1864, exposed a range of suppressions arising from the South’s 
peculiar institution. He was the first to coin the term “incidents of servitude,” a term that the 
Court has since adopted for identifying the range of oppressions the Thirteenth Amendment 
47 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (New York Representative Thomas T. 
Davis).
48 See supra text accompanying note ---------.
49 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1865) (Representative George S. Boutwell of 
Massachusetts).
50 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865).
51 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865). Stevens reparation recommendation 
was commonly referred to as “Forty Acres and a Mule.” See Lance S. Hamilton, Note, 
Ethnomiseducationalization: A Legal Challenge, 100 YALE L.J. 1815, 1820 n.18 (1991). Stevens 
argued that the United States should make reparations to the former slaves by providing them 
with homesteads and creating laws to protect their property rights. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 74 (1865). Under President Andrew Johnson’s Proclamation of Amnesty, former slave 
owners reclaimed the plots of land that had been given to blacks by personnel from the Union 
Army and Freedmen’s Bureau. See Derrick Bell, The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV.
4, 9 n.20 (1985). Representative George W. Julian was another radical supporter of land 
confiscation as a means of punishing the South and allaying the suffering of the newly freed 
through land distribution. WILLIAM L. RICHTER, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1877, at 
240-41 (1996).
52 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1865).
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prohibits.53 Harlan listed interference with parental and marital relationships, the prohibition 
against participation on juries, restrictions against black property ownership, interference with 
the right to testify in court, and the suppression of free speech as examples of the incidents of 
slavery.54 Senator Henry Wilson believed that the abolition of those incidents would renew the 
United States commitment to its creed of liberty:
If this amendment shall be incorporated by the will of the nation into the 
Constitution of the United States, it will obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the 
slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, 
barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to 
it, from the face of the nation it was scarred with moral desolation, from the 
bosom of the country it has reddened with the blood and strewn with the graves of 
patriotism. The incorporation of this amendment into the organic law of the nation 
will make impossible forevermore the reappearing of the discarded slave system, 
and the returning of the despotism of the slavemasters’ domination.55
In place of shackles of slavery, federal law would respect natural rights by protecting family 
interests.56 Enforced ignorance, too, was incidental to involuntary servitude, and education was 
essential to ending the enforced subjugation of slaves.57
There was, indeed, a consensus during the congressional debates that the Thirteenth 
Amendment would empower Congress to pass legislation directed at any of arbitrary practices 
associated with involuntary servitude and slavery.58 The rupture between the Confederacy and 
53 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 
409 (1968) (“this Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have encompassed, the 
badges and incidents of slavery–its ‘burdens and disabilities’–included restrations [sic] upon 
‘those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens’”), quoting Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
54 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439-40 (1864); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 
U.S. 409 (1968)
55 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864) (emphasis added). 
56 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864). Senator Jacob M. Howard, who had 
been on the Senate Judiciary Committee that reported the language of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, likewise believed that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to 
protect “the ordinary rights of a freeman,” including rights appertaining to the family. CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 503-04 (1866).
57 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864). Numerous antebellum Southern states 
made it a criminal offence to educate blacks. James W. Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, & 
Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 421, 487 (1999).
58 See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE & THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, & 
LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 98-99 (1993).
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the Union empowered a federalist-minded group of legislators.59 During the Civil War, many 
Republicans adopted radical abolitionist principles about the federal government’s obligation to 
eradicate slavery, and many of the opponents of the Thirteenth Amendment decried their 
republican brand of federalism.60 Even President Lincoln, who also thought slavery was “a total 
violation” of the Declaration of Independence, initially held to a gradualist, state-by-state 
approach. His views changed only during the War when he realized that Southern states would 
not be appeased into abandoning their expansionist ambitions.61
Reconstruction, which began to take shape after Lincoln’s death, provided an opportunity 
to address human rights violations through federal legislation.62 During that period, Congress 
passed three amendments, beginning with the Thirteenth, which granted the national government 
a degree of power to protect civil rights that it had never before possessed.63 The limited time 
59
 The congressional leadership, for a time, was populated with Radical Republicans who 
sought to gain equal status for blacks.  On the House side, Thaddeus Stevens was the leader of 
the Committee on the Ways and Means during the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and, 
then, the Committee on Appropriations during the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
James A. Woodburn, The Attitude of Thaddeus Stevens Toward the Conduct of the Civil War, 12
AM. HIST. REV. 567, 567 (1907). Charles Sumner became the Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations in 1861. Mark M. Krug, The Republican Party & the Emancipation 
Proclamation, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 98, 103 (1963). Henry Wilson was Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Naval Affairs. Id. Even more moderate leaders in the Republican party, like 
Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, rejected gradual 
abolitionism. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) (arguing the Thirteenth 
Amendment abolished slavery in all states and  destroyed all “incidents to slavery”).
60
 The Thirteenth Amendment is a rejection of a view that Democrats and Southern 
Whigs had long held, purporting that slavery was a state institution that only state authorities 
could limit. See e.g. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2991(1864) (stating that enforcing 
federal protections of civil rights “shall have any effect at all, must be fatal; fatal to the very life 
of the Constitution, fatal to the fundamental principles of the Republic, the right, the irrepressible 
rt of the States to domestic government”).
61
 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois, in Reply to Senator Douglas, in THE 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 209 (Arthur B. Lapsley ed., 1905) (Oct. 16, 1854).
62
 Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights--Will 
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985) (“The Reconstruction 
Congresses vested individuals with three distinct kinds of protection against state governments, 
protections that were absent in the prewar structure: federal rights, federal remedies, and federal 
forums.”).
63
 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-1, at 1293 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“The Civil War, and the [Reconstruction] amendments that were its fairly immediate legacy . . . 
place the issue of personal rights--and the necessity of their direct protection against state 
interference--squarely within the cognizance of the federal Constitution and the federal 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art9
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during which the Reconstruction Congress was able to exercise its authority, until the 
Compromise of 1877 brought it to an abrupt end,64 provided Congress the opportunity to pass 
legislation guaranteeing equal access to courts, the right to purchase and convey real and personal
property, and power to enter and enforce contracts.65
The Amendment process, under Article V of the Constitution, was the means Radicals 
used for altering the Constitution’s initially inimical provisions. The Thirteenth Amendment 
provides an enforceable right for the protection of those civil liberties that until its ratification 
had been valued but not implemented. The Amendment allows Congress to secure liberty, life, 
and the pursuit of happiness through positive laws.66
The ideological goal behind the Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause is a national 
commitment to secure individual liberty as the only means of providing civil welfare. Radical 
advocates of the first Reconstruction Amendment sought to remove all classist and racist barriers 
abridging civil rights. They regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of restoring the 
natural rights long denied to blacks in particular and laborers in general. According to 
progressive reformers, the Amendment not only freed blacks from bondage, it also gave 
Congress the power to pass legislation protecting fundamental choices, including those about 
occupational and family life. Such power was needed to prevent the defeated South from 
legitimizing arbitrary forms of domination that the Civil War was meant to end. Congressman 
Martin Russell Thayer, who was a Pennsylvania representative to Congress between 1863 and 
1867, expressed the same point in rhetorical terms: “What kind of freedom is that which is given 
by the amendment of the Constitution, and if it is confined simply to the exemption of the 
freedom from sale and barter? Do you give freedom to a man when you allow him to be deprived 
of those great natural rights to which every man is entitled by nature?”67
judiciary.”).
64 See supra note -------.
65
 In relevant part, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 
14 Stat. 27 (currently codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000)) provides:
[t]hat all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United 
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous 
condition of slavery ... shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in 
the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, and penalties and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
66 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1864) (Godlove S. Orth of Indiana) 
(arguing for a practical application of natural rights principles via the Thirteenth Amendment).
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (Mar. 2, 1866).
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Congressmen who worked against the proposed amendment realized that Republicans 
aimed to do much more than simply remove the shackles of forced labor. They feared that 
abolishing slavery would be tantamount to granting blacks political and civic rights, like the right 
to vote and to be part of a jury.68 A memorable exchange between Representatives William D. 
Kelley and John D. Stiles, both of whom were from Pennsylvania, indicates that the advocates of 
both sides of the argument realized the Thirteenth Amendment could be used to obtain equal 
citizenship rights for blacks, even though the Amendment never explicitly mentions them. Mr. 
Stiles inquired whether the Amendment would favor racial equality between the races.69 Mr. 
Kelly responded that arbitrary racialist views should not be used to prevent blacks from 
exercising the same degree of political control as whites.70 The concern of losing white control
over the government was also on Representatives Chilton A. White’s mind: “Do you propose to 
enfranchise them, and make them ‘before the law,’ . . . the equals of the white man; give them 
the right to suffrage; the right to hold office; the right to sit on juries? Do you intend . . . to make 
this a mongrel Government, instead of a white man’s Government?”71
Section 2 of the proposed amendment, containing the enforcement clause, gave the 
greatest pause to Congressmen who opposed passing it unto the states for ratification.72 The 
second clause, as its founders understood it and as the Supreme Court later interpreted it,73 went 
far beyond merely granting Congress the power to enact legislation against the exploitation of 
slaves. Ohio Senator John Sherman, who in later years was Secretary of the Treasury under 
68
 Ohio Representative Chilton A. White made this point cautiously through a series of 
questions designed to raise concerns about passing the proposed amendment: “What will be the 
effect of turning loose this mass of people? Where will they go? What do you propose to do with 
them? Do you propose to enfranchise them, and make them ‘before the law,’ as the gentlemean 
from Pennsylvania [Thaddeus Stevens] says, the equals of the white man; give them the right of 
suffrage; the right to hold office; the right to sit upon juries? Do you intend, in other words, to 
make this a mongrel Government, instead of a white man’s Government? Do you intend to 
degrade the United States of America to the low condition of the provinces of Central America? 
Is it for that that we are wasting our blood and our treasure?” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 216 (1865)
69 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 291 (1865).
70 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 291 (1865).
71 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1865); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2982 (1864) (protesting that Radical Republicans meant to make “Black free men . . . 
American citizens” ).
72 See Howard D. Hamilton, The Legislative & Judicial History of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 9 NAT’L B.J. 26, 45-46 (1951) (quoting concerns about the breadth of congressional 
power under the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment that were voiced by a delegate 
from Mississippi and the provisional governor of South Carolina).
73
 On Court interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment see Part ----- infra.
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Rutherford B. Hayes and, later, Secretary of State under President William McKinley, considered 
the Thirteenth Amendment to be a “guarantee of liberty” and the second section to be “an express 
grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty by appropriate legislation.”74 Without the rights 
of citizens everywhere “freedom” was a meaningless concept: “ Now unless a man may be free 
w/o the right to sue and be sued, to plead and be impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and to 
testify in a court of justice, then Congress has the power by the express terms of this amendment, 
to secure all these rights. To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not able to assert and maintain 
his right, in a court of justice, is a negation of terms.”75 Sherman linked the Reconstruction 
Congress’s decision to grant Congress the power to protect citizenship rights to the need of 
maintaining comity between the states for securing universal liberties.76
Schuyler Colfax opened the Thirty-ninth Congress, as the incoming Speaker of the House 
in 1865, with a statement on fundamental rights protected under the Thirteenth Amendment: “[I]t 
is yours,” Colfax told the House, “to mature and enact legislation which . . . shall establish [state 
governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee all necessary safeguards 
to the people, and afford what our Magnet Carta, the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is 
the chief object of government –protection of all men in their inalienable rights.”77 His ideas 
were not only important because the powerful position he then held, but also because he had 
made it prior to the introduction of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. His statement, 
therefore, indicates the congressional understanding of its power to protect liberty interests 
through the Thirteenth Amendment.
Senator Trumbull, in 1866, about a year after states had ratified the Amendment, 
reiterated that the second clause was meant to give Congress the power to adopt any legislation it 
deemed to be appropriate to actuate liberty.78 He regarded the ambit of congressional power to 
extend to ending interference with commercial transactions, ownership rights, and educational 
enrolment. 79
Both the supporters and adversaries of abolition relied on the founding fathers to bolster 
their respective arguments. Representative Francis W. Kellogg of Michigan asserted that the 
Thirteenth Amendment was meant to promote the general welfare, which is the primary object of 
the Constitution.80 Congressman Morris of New York held the contractarian perspective that the 
74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865).
75 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865).
76 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865). 
77 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1865).
78 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866). Trumbull’s view, however, can in no 
way be characterized as equalitarian since on the very same page this moderate Republican 
proclaimed that laws prohibiting intermarriage were equitable and constitutional. See id.
79 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866).
80 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (1864).
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Constitution could be amended to prohibit slavery since “each member upon entering society 
covenants to yield his particular to the general good, and to so comport as to infract none of the 
rights of others, and also not to incapacitate himself for the discharge of the duties growing out of 
the social relations.”81 Another Republican believed slavery was an evil the founders accepted 
but “regarded as temporary in its character and as tolerable only by reason of the exigencies of 
the hour.”82 Opponents of the proposed Amendment, on the other hand, claimed that its adoption 
was an impermissible assertion of power since the Amendment would materially alter 
government as the founders had envisioned it.83 The founders, Senator Willard Saulsbury of 
Delaware claimed, wanted to preserve the right to slave property not to give the the Union 
“control over the domestic relations existing in the state, not to regulate the right and title of 
property in the States.”84
These differing views on the founders’ predilections on slavery must be analyzed to 
comprehend the significance of the Declaration and Preamble to the Thirteenth Amendment. A 
better understanding of American freedom can help guide Congress in using its enforcement 
power.
II. Revolutionary Fervor for Liberty
The ideological justification for the American revolution was irreconcilable with 
institutionalized slavery. Political and religious leaders regarded the revolution as a struggle for 
natural liberties that the British government had infringed.85 That justification was incompatible 
81 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 2614 (1865)
82 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 154 (1865).
83 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 186 (1864) (“The change you propose is a 
fundamental change of your Government never before contemplated by its founders.”); id. at 
2941 (“It will be, if adopted, a change in the fundamental law–a material alteration in the 
Constitution of the United States as formed by the founders of the Government”). 
84 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1864).
85
 American revolutionists came from a British tradition that regarded freedom to be a 
natural birthright. See ARTHUR YOUNG, POLITICAL ESSAYS CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATE OF 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 19 (1772) (“Liberty is the natural birthright of mankind; and yet to take a 
comprehensive view of the world, how few enjoy it! What a melancholy reflection is it to think 
that more than nine-tenths of the species should be miserable slaves of despotic tyrants!”); 
WILLIAM PATTEN, DISCOURSE AT HALLIFAX IN THE COUNTY OF PLYMOUTH, JULY 24TH 1766, at 
(1766) (“We may from what has been said infer, in the first place, that FREEDOM is our natural 
right, equally with other men.”). Laws, they believed, could not take away fundamental rights. 
See, e.g., JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON & FEUDAL LAW, in 3 Works of John 
Adams 445, 448-49 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1865) (1765) ( Rights, that cannot be repealed or 
restrained by human laws—Rights, derived from the great Legislator of the universe.” ). See also
SAMUEL ADAMS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONISTS (Report of the Committee of Correspondence to 
the Boston Town Meeting Nov. 20, 1772) available at
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with the exploitation of human chattel and the enforcement of slave codes. For slaves, the 
struggle for freedom was even more urgent than it was for white colonists who, like Patrick 
Henry, preferred death to a life of political bondage.86 Some revolutionary leaders drew attention 
to the incongruity between the American demand for freedom and its protection of slavery. 
Alexander Hamilton, for instance, wrote that “[n]o reason can be assigned why one man should 
exercise any power, or preeminence over his fellow creatures more than another; unless they 
have voluntarily vested him with it.”87
Thomas Paine, in his first published article, also drew attention to this inconsistency. He 
entreated Americans to consider “[w]ith what consistency, or decency they complain so loudly of 
attempts to enslave them, while they hold so many hundred thousands in slavery; and annually 
enslave many thousands more, without any pretence of authority, or claim upon them.”88 
Colonial pamphleteers often used “slavery” figuratively in their opposition to the British 
Parliament’s intrusion against individual liberties. While their views on the despotism of slavery 
and on the boon of liberty were applicable to all Americans, many revolutionaries regarded only 
white males as possessed of natural rights. This illogical dichotomy was based on the prejudice 
of revolutionary times. Despite their disregard for the logical consequences of their political 
philosophy, the founders’ views on slavery and liberty help explain the meaning of those terms to 
the Reconstruction Congress, which relied heavily on revolutionary tenets. The enforcement 
clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was a product of the United States republican ideology as it 
emerged during the Revolution.
The revolutionary generation, at least in its rhetoric, sought to organize a free republic. 
The Sons of Liberty rallied colonists against taxation without representation; Liberty Polls were 
assembly places; Patrick Henry embodied the revolutionary project in his pithy statement “Give 
me liberty or give me death”; and Thomas Paine believed America to be “the place where the 
principle of universal freedom could take root.”89 Slavery was so incompatible with colonial 
<http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right_col.htm> (last visited May 7, 2004) (“Among the natural 
rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; 
together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they can. . . . All men have 
a right to remain in a state of nature as nature of a social compact, necessarily ceded, remains. ¶ 
All positive and civil laws should conform, as far as possible, to the law of natural reason and 
equity.”)
86 See 1 WILLIAM W. HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE & SPEECHES 266 
(1891) (Mar. 23, 1775) (“Forbid it, almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but 
as for me, give me liberty or give me death!”).
87 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF THE CONGRESS 5 
(1774). 
88 African Slavery in America, in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 4, 7 (Moncure D. 
Conway ed., 1894) (1775). Available in electronic form at 
<http://www.libertystory.net/LSDOCPAINESLAVERY.htm> (last visited July 21, 2004).
89
  Eric Foner, The Meaning of Freedom In the Age of Emancipation, 81 J. AM. HIST.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
20
aspirations that revolutionaries often declared they were under the British yoke of slavery.90
Slavery symbolized the political oppressions from which colonists demanded relief. The 
meaning of “slavery” that Reconstructionists derived from the founders’ writings was “being 
wholly under the power and controul of another, as to our actions and properties.”91 The opposite 
of being in servitude, defined Richard Price, in a work that enjoyed widespread popularity, was 
to be guided by one’s will.92 The political conception of slavery appeared in colonial writings as 
early as the 1740's. An anonymous author of that decade contrasted natural liberty of action and 
thought to the slavery of arbitrary power.93 This contrast also appeared in the pamphlets that were 
printed during the War of Independence. One polemicist contrasted the felicity of liberty to the 
debasement of slavery, which “discourages industry, frugality, and every thing praise-worthy; 
introduces ignorance and poverty, with the most sordid vices, and universal misery.”94 Men who 
are deprived of their liberty, preached Gad Hitchcock, are debased to the “primitive standard of 
humanity,” becoming stupid, indolent, and indifferent to improvement.”95 Despite the public 
outcry against the arbitrary use of British power, colonists committed even worse oppressions 
against their slaves.96
435, 439 (1994); FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1985); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 23-25 
(1982).
90 BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM: THE PROTESTANT 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 289-91 (1994).
91 MOSES MATHER, AMERICA’S APPEAL TO THE IMPARTIAL WORLD 48 (1775).
92 RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, in TWO TRACTS ON 
CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA 11 (1778) (“In general to be free is to be guided by one 
s own will; and to be guided by the will of another is the characteristic of Servitude.”).
93 See New York Evening Post, November 16, 1747 (“Liberty is a natural Power of doing, 
or not doing, whatever we have a Mind . . . . Slavery is a force put upon human Nature, by which 
a Man is obliged to act, or not to act, according to the arbitrary will and Pleasure of another.”)
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 JUDAH CHAMPION, CHRISTIAN & CIVIL LIBERTY & FREEDOM CONSIDERED & 
RECOMMENDED 14 (1776).
95 GAD HITCHCOCK, A SERMON PREACHED AT PLYMOUTH DECEMBER 22, 1774, at 17 
(1775).
96
 The American Anti-Slavery Society’s Declaration, which it drafted on December 4, 
1833 pointed out the discrepancy between what the white colonists and black colonists achieved 
through the revolution: “We have men together for the achievement of an enterprise, without 
which, that of our fathers is incomplete . . . Their grievances, great as they were, were trifling in 
comparison with the wrongs and sufferings of those for whom we plead. our fathers were never 
slaves–never bought and sold like cattle–never shut out from the light of knowledge and 
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Most pamphleteers were concerned with ending the slavery of parliamentary 
encroachment on colonial rights rather than the slavery that colonists practiced. Revolutionary 
sermonizers and political writers, during the 1760's and 1770's, decried several British 
parliamentary laws as attempts to enslave the colonists. A clergyman who gave a sermon at 
Billerica, Massachusetts, soon after the Stamp Act was repealed in 1766, spoke of the heavens 
recovering “their wonted serenity,. . . [and] reviving liberty,. . . .with heightened lustre and 
beauty” while slavery “vanishes out of sight.”97 Benjamin Throop, a Connecticut clergyman, also 
rejoiced about the repeal of the Stamp Act that had placed the colonists into “vile ignominious 
slavery.”98
Others decried the use of several parliamentary measures they regarded to be absolutist 
attempts at their enslavement.99 The Townshend Revenue Act of 1767, which imposed duties on 
a variety of items including tea and paper, was widely condemned because it tended to reduce 
Americans to slavery. “For what slavery can be more compleat” rhetorically asked a Philadelphia 
Grand Jury, “more miserable, more disgraceful, than that lot of a people,” that was governed by 
laws not of their own making.100 John Dickinson, who would become a central figure in the 
Continental Congress, wrote in a similar fashion that persons who were taxed without their 
consent were in “a state of the most abject slavery.”101 The same year Silas Downer, the 
corresponding secretary of the Sons of Liberty for Rhode Island, denounced taxation without 
Americans’ consent to be the “the lowest bottom of slavery.”102 The Tea Act, through which 
CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12, 12-13 (1833).
97 HENRY CUMINGS, A THANKSGIVING SERMON PREACHED AT BILLERICA, NOVEMBER 27, 
1766, at 21 (1767). See also ELISHA FISH, JOY AND GLADNESS: A THANKSGIVING DISCOURSE . . . 
OCCASIONED BY THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP-ACT 10 (1767) (“Surely we have not so soon forgot 
the dark day, when the Sun of our Liberty set in a gloomy cloud, which, for a season, boded 
perpetual night.”)
98 BENJAMIN THROOP, A THANKSGIVING SERMON, UPON THE OCCASION, OF THE 
GLORIOUS NEWS OF THE REPEAL OF THE STAMP-ACT 13 (1766).
99 THE SPEECHES OF HIS EXCELLENCY GOVERNOR HUTCHINSON, TO THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS-BAY. AT A SESSION BEGUN AND HELD ON THE SIXTH OF 
JANUARY, 1773, at 34, 44 (1773) (“the Minds of the People were filled with Anxiety, and they 
were justly alarmed with Apprehensions of the total Extinction of their Liberties . . . . nothing is 
more evident, than that any People who are subject to the unlimited Power of another, must be in 
a State of abject Slavery”).
100
 Philadelphia Grand Jury (Sept. 24 1770), BOSTON EVENING-POST, Nov. 5, 1770, at 4.
101 JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA, TO THE INHABITANTS 
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 53 (1768). Dickinson believed that politically unrepresented persons 
were slaves, and since the colonists had been taxed without their consent they had, in effect, been 
enslaved. Id. at 38.
102 SILAS DOWNER, A DISCOURSE, DELIVERED IN PROVIDENCE 10 (1768).
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Parliament imposed the tax on tea that spurred the Boston Tea Party to sabotage in December 
1773, was viewed as the “[e]nsign of their arbitrary Dominion [and] of your Slavery.”103 In 
dramatic fashion, Josiah Quincy proclaimed: “WE ARE SLAVES!” of the British oppressors.104 The 
implication, as another pamphleteer remarked was that persons who were not treated as 
“subjects,” or citizens in modern terminology, were slaves.105 The use of absolute parliamentary 
power, Alexander Hamilton wryly remarked, resulted in colonial slavery.106 The analogy was not 
lost on common folk. A private in the army wrote his parents on July 4, 1777 that colonial 
courage and conduct would “determine whether Americans are to be free men or slaves.”107
These were tragically ironic phrases given that hereditary slavery was then legal in all the 
colonies.
The blindness to colonial oppressions drove one observed to the astonishment that “Men 
who feel the Value and Importance of Liberty as much as the In habitants of the southern States 
do that of their own, should keep such Numbers of the human Species in a State of so absolute 
Vassalage.”108 The Reconstruction would later try to reclaim the initial disgust with arbitrary 
oppression without the classist contradictions that had accompanied the drive for independence. 
The Radical Republicans, who gave the Thirteenth Amendment the inertia needed for its 
ratification, were raised in a tradition marked by a narrowly constructed form of antislavery that 
waxed in the years leading up to the Revolution. One Harvard educated Congregational minister, 
Nathaniel Appleton, realized that the colonial protest in 1765 against the Stamp Act and its 
repeal would have been more glorious “if at the time we are establishing Liberty for ourselves 
and children, we show the same regard to all mankind that come among us.”109
Literature of this sort shifted American colonial conscience during the 1760's and 1770's 
103 HAMPDEN, THE ALARM (NO. III) (Oct. 15, 1773).
104 JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT COMMONLY CALLED 
THE BOSTON PORT-BILL (1774).
105 AN ARGUMENT IN DEFENCE OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT CLAIMED BY THE COLONIES TO 
TAX THEMSELVES (1774), quoted in JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION  49 (1988).
106 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A FULL VINDICATION OF THE MEASURES OF CONGRESS 4 
(1774).
107 Quoted in PHILIP DAVIDSON, PROPAGANDA AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763-
1783, at 341 (1941).
108 Ebenezer Hazard’s Travels through Maryland in 1777, 46 MARYLAND HISTORICAL 
MAGAZINE 44, 50 (Fred Shelley ed., 1951).
109 NATHANIEL APPLETON, CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVERY 19 (1767). Seeing the liberal 
success against the Stamp Act, blacks paraded along Charleston, South Carolina’s streets 
proclaiming “Liberty!” MERTON L. DILLON, SLAVERY ATTACKED: SOUTHERN SLAVES AND THEIR 
ALLIES, 1619-1865, at 28-29 (1990).
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away from an almost universal complacency about slavery to a widespread antagonism toward 
the institution.110 Most of the North gradually came to understand the incongruity between racial 
slavery and the battle with England to secure colonists’ natural and civil liberties, and by 1830, 
only 2,780 blacks remained enslaved in Northern states.111 In spite of this awareness, an 
Amendment abolishing slavery would become necessary because during the Revolutionary War 
most white founders advocated freedom only for themselves and those of their own propertied 
class.112 Revolutionary liberals, as the renowned historian David Brion Davis pointed out, “may 
well have agreed that Negro slavery had no place in a free society. But their domestic views, like 
those of the majority of patriot lawyers and political leaders, were moderated by a concern for 
public order, for property rights, and for southern sensibilities.”113
The founders’ definition of tyrannical oppression was unmistakably applicable to chattel 
slavery, but until 1865 there was no national consensus to end institutionalized bondage. The 
revolutionaries’ outcry about their enslavement came from some the most politically active and 
wealthy men in the colonies and is tragically ironic given their eventual adoption of 
constitutional protections for slavery.
Many of them realized the Revolution’s ideological implications to involuntary servitude. 
John Mein, a British Loyalist, pointed out the disingenuousness of Bostonians who grounded 
their struggle in the immutable laws of nature, while they lived in a town with two thousand 
black slaves.114 The evident contradiction evoked a response from English lexicographer and 
opponent of colonial independence, Samuel Johnson. As he saw it, the “loudest yelps for liberty” 
were heard from “drivers of Negroes.”115
During the struggle with England, slavery drew an increasing number of pamphlets 
denouncing the inconsistency of continuing to maintain slavery while battling for the Rights of 
Man. Benjamin Rush, a physician with many political interests, wrote that “it would be useless 
for us to denounce the servitude to which the Parliament of Great Britain wishes to reduce us, 
110 See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-
1823, at 41-42 (1975) (“What was unprecedented by the 1760s and early 1770s was the 
emergence of a widespread conviction that New World slavery symbolized all the forces that 
threatened the true destiny of man.”).
111 ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE 
NORTH 222 (1967).
112
 W. Robert Higgins, The Ambivalence of Freedom: Whites, Blacks, and the Coming of 
the American Revolution in the South, in 4 SLAVERY, REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, & THE NEW 
NATION 128-29 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1989).
113 DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-
1823, at 286 (1975).
114 JOHN MEIN, SAGITTARIUS’S LETTERS & POLITICAL SPECULATIONS 38-39 (1775).
115
 Quoted in PHILIP S. FONER, 1 HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS 303 (1975) (“How is 
that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes ?”).
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while we continue to keep our fellow creatures in slavery just because their color is different 
from ours.”116 England would not accept the force of revolutionary reasoning, wrote another 
author in 1774, until Americans ended the cruelty of slavery.117 John Allen, who lacked Rush’s 
political ambitions, denounced slaveholders in stronger terms, calling them “trifling patriots” and 
“pretended votaries for Freedom.” who trampled on the natural rights and privileges of Africans 
while they made a “vain parade of being advocates of the liberties of mankind”118 He further 
pointed out that a duty on tea was of far smaller consequence than the bondage of a captive.119
Religious leaders, as their secular counterparts, drew attention to the need for moral 
reform. Samuel Hopkins plea on behalf of blacks was heart wrenching since he realized that 
Americans were enslaving many thousands of their “brethren, who have as good a right to liberty 
as ourselves.”120 The miserable oppressions of slavery, complained Hopkins, were contrary to the 
colonists’ plea of liberty and violated religious morality as well as the precepts of humanity and 
charity.121 Reverend Nathaniel Niles of Newbury, Massachusetts, in 1774, pointed out America’s 
shame in struggling for their while continuing “to enslave their fellow men.”122 Clergyman 
Nathaniel Appleton asked the “sons of liberty” to realize that their struggles for liberty did not 
comport with their continued maintenance of the slave trade.123 If they persisted in this
confounding dumbness, Appleton warned, mankind would laugh at their pretensions.124
The most far sighted of the religious opponents of slavery was the Quaker Anthony 
Benezet. He not only dispelled the notion that slavery was a benevolent institution,125 but further 
116
 Quoted in DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF 
REVOLUTION 1770-1823, at 274 (1975).
117 RICHARD WELLS, A FEW POLITICAL REFLECTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION 
OF THE BRITISH COLONIES 80 (1774).
118 JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN’S ALARM TO LORD N- - -H 27 (1774).
119 JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN’S ALARM TO LORD N- - -H 28 (1774).
120 SAMUEL HOPKINS, A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE SLAVERY OF THE AFRICANS; 
SHEWING IT TO BE THE DUTY AND INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES TO EMANCIPATE ALL 
THEIR AFRICAN SLAVES 50 (1776).
121 SAMUEL HOPKINS, A DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE SLAVERY OF THE AFRICANS; 
SHEWING IT TO BE THE DUTY AND INTEREST OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES TO EMANCIPATE ALL 
THEIR AFRICAN SLAVES 52 (1776)
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 Quoted in DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 74-75 (1971).
123 NATHANIEL APPLETON, CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVERY 19 (1767).
124 NATHANIEL APPLETON, CONSIDERATIONS ON SLAVERY 19 (1767).
125 ANTHONY BENEZET, SOME HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF GUINEA ch. 11 (1771) (providing 
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reflected on how to free those Africans who had been enslaved. He realized that without 
receiving some aid after their liberation, former slaves would be unable to compete with other 
free persons. Therefore, he recommended that both adults and children receive instruction 
adequate for becoming productive members of the community.126 Seeking to calm the fears of 
whites about free blacks, Benezet explained how liberation would help government achieve 
security and welfare: the tax burden would be decreased because the obligation to pay taxes 
would fall on everyone, the trades and arts would be advanced, and productivity would be 
increased since more vacant land would be cultivated.127 Abolition, therefore, would benefit the 
general welfare. Liberation, meant much more than just ending obligatory labor; it required 
colonists to grant blacks the opportunity to participate in the privileges of equal residency.
Some black contemporaries also adopted the egalitarian significance of revolutionary 
thought to their demand of freedom. A group of black New Hampshire petitioners used natural 
rights terminology to make their point “[t]hat freedom is an inherent right of the human species . 
. . [and] [t]hat private or public tyranny and slavery are alike detestable.”128 Similarly, on April 
20, 1773 black petitioners from Massachusetts expressed their expectation of “great things from 
men who have made such a noble stand against the designs of their fellow-men to enslave 
them.”129 The same year, in another petition that blacks from Boston and other Massachusetts 
provinces demanded relief from the manifold burdens New England slavery placed upon them, 
“We have no Property! We have no Wives! No Children! We have no City! No Country.”130
Lemuel Haynes, a racially mixed minister, wrote that “an African, or, in other terms, . . . a Negro, 
. . . has and undeniable right to his Liberty.”131 A“Great Number of Blackes detained in the State 
of slavery” petitioned the Massachusetts Assembly in 1777.132 They requested that the 
Massachusetts Assembly:
eyewitness accounts of Africa in opposition to inaccurate accounts about the enslavement of 
Africans).
126 ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT PART OF AFRICA, INHABITED BY THE 
NEGROES 71 (3d ed. 1768).
127 ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT PART OF AFRICA, INHABITED BY THE 
NEGROES 71-72 (3d ed. 1768).
128 JORDAN, supra note ----, at 291.
129
 Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, & Revolutionary New 
England: A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777, 62 NEW ENG. Q. 248, 
255 (1989).
130 Id. at 252.
131 Quoted in Ruth Bogin, ‘Liberty Further Extended’: A 1776 Antislavery Manuscript by 
Lemuel Haynes, 40 WM & MARY Q. 85, 92 (3 ser., 1983).
132 Quoted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
9 (1951).
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give this petion its due weight & consideration & cause an act of the Legislatur to 
be past Wherby they may be Restored to the Enjoyments of that which is the 
Naturel Right of all men—and their Children who wher Born in this Land of 
Liberty may not be heald as Slaves after they arive at the age of twenty one years 
so may the Inhabitance of this Stats No longer chargeable with the inconsistancy 
of acting themselves the part which they condem and oppose in others Be 
prospered in their present Glorious struggle for Liberty and have those Blessing to 
them.133
In Massachusetts, where slaves were regarded as property and persons, blacks brought 
freedom suits against their masters.134 Several litigants were successful, during the decade before 
the Revolution, in moving Massachusetts courts to grant them freedom.135 The death knell came 
from the Massachusetts Supreme Court which, in 1783, interpreted the state’s constitution to 
prohibit slavery.136
Even the Southern vanguard of the revolution realized the anomaly between liberty’s 
cause and the inequitable institution they chose to perpetuate after independence. Patrick Henry, 
for one, acknowledged his hypocrisy. After scrutinizing one of Benezet’s abolitionist tracts, 
Henry wrote:
is it not amazing, that at a time when the rights of Humanity are defined & 
understood with precision in a Country above all others fond of Liberty: that in 
such an Age and such a Country, we find Men, professing a Religion the most 
133 Quoted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES
10 (1951). 
134 See Benjamin Quarles, The Revolutionary War as a Black Declaration of 
Independence, in SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 283, 290 
(Ira Berlin and Ronald Hoffman eds., 1983).
135 PHILIP A. KLINKNER WITH ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH 14 (1997).
136
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humane, mild, meek, gentle & generous, adopting a Principle as repugnant to 
humanity . . . .  Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own 
purchase! I am drawn along by ye general Inconvenience of living without them; I 
will not, I cannot justify it. . . . I believe a time will come when an opperturnity 
will be offered to abolish this lamentable Evil.137
Little could Henry know that the “lamentable Evil” would only be abolished after a bloody civil 
war. Thomas Jefferson also realized how incongruous slavery was in the age of revolution. 
Jefferson, indeed, had some premonition about the national catastrophe that slavery could create, 
believing that it would destroy the morals of the people.138 The need for a federal union and the 
widely held belief in the inferiority of blacks and Indians paved the way for a national 
compromise that kept slavery intact after the Revolution and set the country on a path to war 
against itself.
American antislavery literature of the eighteenth century relied on universalistic 
principles of natural law to make its case against granting slave owners legal concessions. It 
rejected racialist biological views, purporting blacks to be less evolutionarily developed than 
whites.139 Blacks and whites, wrote Benezet, are of the same species; therefore, they are on a 
137
 Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants, January 18, 1773, reprinted in GEORGE 
S. BROOKES, FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443 - 44 (1937).
138 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162-63 (1955) (1787) (“The 
whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous 
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other. . . .With the morals of the people, their industry also is destroyed. . . . I tremble for my 
country when I reflect that God is just.”) For a further discussion Jefferson’s paltry condemnation 
of slavery see WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 430-36 (1968); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE 
PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 164-84 (1975); DUNCAN J. 
MACLEOD, SLAVERY, RACE & THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 126-29 (1974).
139
 In his well-known account of Jamaica, for instance, Edward Long popularized the 
comparison of blacks with apes and helped develop it into scientific jargon. See HISTORY OF 
JAMAICA 360, 365, 370 (1774). One anonymous author began his bombast by describing all 
peoples on the West Coast of Africa as “the most stupid, beastly race of animals in human shape, 
of any in the whole world. The brutality, nastiness, indolence and other criminal propensities of 
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SLAVERY ESTABLISHED 18-19 (1773).
In response to this pseudo-anthropology, numerous colonial writers denied black 
inequality, including JOHN WESLEY, THOUGHTS UPON SLAVERY 46-47 (1774) (“Certainly the 
African is in no respect inferior to the European.”); BENJAMIN RUSH, ADDRESS TO THE 
INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN AMERICA, UPON SLAVE-KEEPING 2 (1775) (“The 
accounts which travellers give us of [African’s] ingenuity, humanity, and strong attachment to 
their parents, relations, friends and country, show us that they are equal to the Europeans”); 
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naturally equal footing.140 “Hereditary tyrants,” stated an anonymous pamphlet, place whites on a 
pedestal with gods while they degrade another part of humanity and treat them like brutes.141
Before his nervous breakdown, in 1764, James Otis asserted that all colonists, both white and 
black, are born naturally free.142 He viewed the institution of slavery as a despoiler of civilization 
that prefers the interests of petty tyrants to the value of liberty.143 Citizens were of white, brown 
and black complexion, on all of whom the sun rose daily.144 The commerce in humans was 
against nature, wrote Abraham Booth, because everyone, whether African or European, has an 
“equal claim to personal liberty with any man upon earth.”145 Everyone, therefore, has a common 
stock of human rights.146
Individual colonists, like General William Whipple, who served the nation from 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, acted on the logic of natural rights. In 1777, Whipple’s slave said, 
“you are going to fight for your liberty, but I have none to fight for.”147 These words cut Whipple 
to the quick, and he immediately freed the slave.
To many who fought in the late eighteenth century to attain American freedom, the end of 
slavery did not seem so many years away. Historian Winthrop D. Jordan has pointed out that in 
THOMAS CLARKSON, AN ESSAY ON THE SLAVERY AND COMMERCE OF THE HUMAN SPECIES 113 
(1786) (“if [Africans] had the same expectations in life as other people, and the same 
opportunities of improvement, they would be equal, in all the various branches of science, to the 
Europeans, and that the argument that states them ‘to be inferiour link of the chain of nature, and 
designed for servitude,’ as far as it depends on the inferiority of their capacities, is wholly 
malevolent and false”).
140 ANTHONY BENEZET, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THAT PART OF AFRICA, INHABITED BY THE 
NEGROES 52 (1762).
141 A LETTER FROM *****, IN LONDON . . . ON THE . . . SLAVE-TRADE 16 (1784) (“Yes 
gentlemen, men of liberal minds like yours, acknowledge all mankind to be their equals. Leave 
hereditary tyrants and their flatterers to make distinctions unknown to nature and to degrade one 
part of the species to brutes, while they equal the other with gods!”).
142 JAMES OTIS, RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 29 (1764).
143 JAMES OTIS, RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 29 (1764).
144 JAMES OTIS, CONSIDERATIONS ON BEHALF OF THE COLONISTS 30 (2d ed. 1765). In 
opposition to the Stamp Act, Otis wrote: “That I may not appear too paradoxical, I affirm, and 
that on the best information, the Sun rises and sets every day in the sight of five millions of his 
majesty’s American subjects, white, brown and black.” Id.
145 ABRAHAM BOOTH, COMMERCE IN THE HUMAN SPECIES 22 (1792).
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the years preceding the Revolution there was a general impression that slavery was a “communal 
sin.”148 Benjamin Rush noticed this tendency in a letter to Granville Sharp, a British abolitionist. 
“The cause of African freedom in America,” Rush wrote in 1774 “continues to gain ground.”149
He expected slavery in America to end within forty years.150 That view, however, wound up 
being overly optimistic. Another ninety years and Civil War would intervene before the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification.
In spite of the widespread realization that slavery devalued the founders’ moral stance 
against England, abolition was so long in coming, in large part, because many colonialists were 
unwilling to place human rights above economic self-interest and unwilling to overcome, or even 
to adequately confront, their racial prejudices. Thomas Jefferson’s experience typifies the loss of 
liberal idealism. Writing during the heyday of American expectations, Jefferson had wanted to 
end the importation of slaves into the colonies and follow that with the “abolition of domestic 
slavery.”151 His original draft of the Declaration of Independence, accused King George of acting 
“against human nature itself” by keeping open an international slave trade which violated the 
“rights of life and liberty of persons of a distant people.”152 That same year, in 1776, Jefferson’s 
second and third drafts of the Virginia Constitution followed revolutionary logic and contained a 
provision that “No person hereafter coming into this country shall be held in slavery under any 
pretext whatever.”153 Thirty-eight years after independence, however, Jefferson had become 
complacent in the oppression that, by then, only a constitutional amendment could eliminate. In 
1814, writing to Edward Coles, who later became the antislavery Governor of Illinois, Jefferson 
acknowledged that “the flame of liberty” that he had hoped would be kindled in the younger 
generation, leading to a popular movement against slavery, had not combusted.154 Jefferson’s 
148 WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLOCK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
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150
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Benjamin Rush & Granville Sharp, 1 J AM. STUD. 1, 5 (John A. Woods ed., 1965). 
151 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA 16 
(1774).
152 Quoted in Tania Tetlow, The Founders & Slavery: A Crisis of Conscience, 3 LOY. J. 
PUB. INT. L. 1, 11 (2001).
153 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 363 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950).
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 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles, Aug. 25, 1814, in 11 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 416-19 (Paul L. Ford, ed., 1905). Coles, who was one time secretary of 
President James Madison and cousin of Dolly Madison, eventually set his own slaves free, but 
only after calling Madison out about his hypocritical conscience on slavery. See RALPH 
KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 551-52 (1971).
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complacency with the plight of slaves, was stark. Despite his avowed disappointment at this 
revolutionary failing, Jefferson counseled Coles not to liberate his slaves.155
Even in 1776, when Jefferson had actively worked to end slave importation, most 
colonial leaders were unwilling to go that far. South Carolina, which would repeatedly appear as 
a leader of the antebellum proslavery camp, expressed its opposition to the draft Declaration’s 
original passage on slave importation, and it was not retained in the Declaration’s final draft.156
Even without the proposed anti-importation passage, the Declaration of Independence 
established liberty as a primary national aspiration.157 In the decades between the ratification of 
the country’s founding documents and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Declaration’s universal guarantee of freedom posed a moral dilemma to politicians and citizens 
who tolerated and participated in an institution contrary to core national commitments. Its terms 
created for the founding generation the rhetorical dilemma of denying to persons of African 
descent the universal right of freedom.158
Legal restrictions on slave lives indicate how constricted the political norms of liberty and 
equality were for many colonists, most especially Southerners. Slave codes governed everything 
from matrimony and travel to living arrangements and leisure time. Penalties on intermarriage 
are a poignant example of how constrained black lives were. The end of slavery under the 
Thirteenth Amendment prohibited the arbitrary restriction on marriage since that had been 
155
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incident of servitude.159
Laws prohibiting intermarriage and interracial sexual relations were enacted on the basis 
of a perverse stereotypes of black men and the objectification of black women.160 Laws 
punishing interracial sexual liaisons had existed in the North as early as the eighteenth century.161
Early colonial attitudes on the subject were made a part of a Massachusetts law from 1705-1706. 
Any blacks and whites who committed fornication together in the Province were to be punished 
by severe whipping, fining, and exclusion from public funding.162 The middle colony of 
Pennsylvania had a similar provision in a 1726 statute for “[b]etter regulating the Negroes in this 
province.”163 Men and women who cohabited in marriage with blacks would be fined and sold 
into servitude for up to seven years, the black spouse would be sold into lifelong slavery, and 
their children would be made servants until they turned thirty-one.164 Pennsylvania punished not 
only the offending couple, it also provided a fine against magistrates and clergy who presided 
over a mixed marriage.165
The entire South also deemed intermarriages to be unlawful. Georgia granted courts the 
power to decide whether to fine or corporally punish white offenders.166 Maryland’s prohibition 
against intermarriage went back to the seventeenth century. The same 1664 law that codified 
hereditary servitude also provided that white women who “disgrace[d]” Maryland by 
intermarrying blacks did “great damage” to the master; therefore, the freeborn woman would 
become her husband’s master’s servant for life and the issue of that union would be slaves.167 By 
159
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1704, Maryland slightly ameliorated the punishment by providing a seven year term of servitude 
for any men or women who had children with black slaves.168 Colonial laws in Virginia and 
South Carolina likewise provided for terms of servitude for whites who had children from 
interracial unions.169 These laws illustrate the extent to which slavery impacted human lives. 
They help to understand the extent of the institution the Thirteenth Amendment ended. The 
Reconstruction Congress expected the Amendment to supercede all of slavocracy’s laws, not 
only to end forced labor.
Before the revolution, slavery was legal in all thirteen colonies.170 Yet some colonies had 
begun legislative efforts to end the institution. In 1774, the Continental Congress required that 
the importation of slaves cease after December 1, 1775.171 But the limited power the colonies 
granted to the Continental Congress made the body incapable of enforcing its decree.172 The 
1787 Northwest Ordinance, though imperfect, was another nationwide effort against the spread 
of slavery to the West. Individual states in the North were also moving to put an end to slavery 
within their borders. Rhode Island, in 1774 restricted the slave trade, prefacing the law with, 
“those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves, should be willing to 
extend personal liberty to others.”173 Connecticut, that same year, passed, “An Act for prohibiting 
the Importation of Indian, Negro or Molatto Slaves.”174 The 1777 Vermont constitution explicitly 
outlawed slavery,175 and the New Hampshire Bill of Rights (1784) seems to have been the 
168
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primary legal impetus to ending slavery there.176 In Massachusetts, Chief Justice William 
Cushing for the Superior Court decreed slavery to be unconstitutional and against principles of 
natural rights since all men are born free and equal.177 Gradual emancipation plans were 
developed in Pennsylvania in 1780, Rhode Island and Connecticut in 1784, New York in 1799, 
and New Jersey in 1804.178
These were only halting steps to making liberty universal; nevertheless, they were 
progressive enough to lead some contemporary observers to believe that soon after the 
Revolution slavery would no longer exist in America. All the Northern and middle states, where 
in 1830 less than 3,000 blacks remained enslaved compared to their 125,000 free blacks, had 
realized the incompatibility of slavery and American liberty principles.179 The social forces that 
acted against the anomaly of slavery joined in a dispute that only ended with the cessation of 
belligerence of the Civil War and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. The colonists 
had, however, failed their ideals by placating Southern interests which were unwilling to ratify 
the Constitution without constitutional protections for slavery.
III. Constitutional Failure of Revolutionary Ideals
The hopes of a liberal equality that the Declaration of Independence sparked did not make 
its way into the Constitution until the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. There were, of 
course, positive signs immediately after the Revolution. Northerner laws abolishing slavery 
bound by their own consent, after they arrive to such age, or bound by law, for the payment of 
debts, damages, fines, costs, or the like.”).
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moved the country in the direction of a constitutional republic.180 The antislavery temperament of 
the revolutionary age, with its emphasis on liberty, did not translate into universal or national 
prohibitions against the institution. To the contrary, many clauses in the Constitution were left 
ambiguous enough to protect slavery in those states where it remained legal.
Despite the public outcry against slavery, the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 
1787 drafted an instrument more ameliorative to the economic interests of southern states than it 
was principled. The founders thereby secured Union, but at the cost of not ending the organized 
tyranny of chattel servitude. Their commitment to the protection of personal property 
overshadowed their hatred for slavery. The drafters of Constitution created an instrument whose 
propertied biases would later catapult the nation into a civil war that would make clear the 
divisiveness and non-compatibility of slavery to a constitutional republic.181
South Carolina and Georgia delegates, at the 1787 Convention, demanded that the 
Constitution include protections for slavery.182 Gaining their votes, came at the cost of throwing 
over the Declaration of Independence’s universal values and taking on a national recognition of 
slavery as a form of property. The Constitution’s protections for the institution created a sectional 
rift on slavery that would lead the country into numerous internal conflicts.183 Even those 
Northern and Upper Southern delegates who had sought an immediate cessation of the slave 
trade gave in to the Deep South’s demands.
To their credit, the founders provided avenues for formal political change, including a 
method for proposing and amending the Constitution with Article V, which Radical Republicans 
later used to nullify the proslavery sections. However, the founders did little to alter oligarchical 
social relations that existed in their own time, granting a disproportionate amount of power to 
slave owners, rather than immediately producing the representative democracy that the 
Declaration heralded.184
The Framers lack of concern for the human rights of slaves was reflected in numerous 
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constitutional clauses.  The constitutional concessions to slavocracy were so extensive that the 
Thirteenth Amendment profoundly altered United States laws and society.185 The original 
Constitution was marked by a glaring contradiction–it was drafted waveringly enough to protect 
liberty and slavery.
Even though the Constitution did not use the terms “slave” or “slavery,” it contained 
numerous protections for the South’s peculiar institution. The clauses that legalized slavery used 
euphemisms to refer to bondsmen–the terms “person held to Service or Labour,” “such persons,” 
and “other persons” had clear referents–which made constitutional passage less contentious and 
alteration easier.
The Importation Clause, which prohibited Congress from abolishing the international 
slave trade for twenty years after state ratification of the Constitution,186 was a most obvious 
accommodation to oppression. This provision was so important to South Carolina and Georgia, 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared, because, without the resupply of fresh slaves, those states 
could not be economically competitive.187 Achieving equality, for Pinckney, meant no more than 
establishing a confederation that gave each state commercial advantage for economic gain.188
Jonathan Rutledge, also of South Carolina, seconded Pinckney’s adamance to retain the 
Importation Clause in the final draft.189
The Importation Clause limited Congress’s authority to levying a ten-dollar head tax for 
each imported slave. Such a deviation from the republican ideals of a free society, to which 
Americans had otherwise committed themselves, was illogical and lead apologists of the 
incongruity to absurd rationales. A landholder, Oliver Ellsworth, in December 1787 claimed that 
the Constitutional Convention adopted the Importation Clause as the best means for future 
abolition.190
Even though some politicians opposed ratification, their stance against sanctioning slave 
importation, was often based on economic calculations rather than moral convictions. The best 
185
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known politician in this group was George Mason. He argued for ending slave importation191 and 
indicted slavery, as a whole, for harming both white migration and slaves’ creative impulses.192
Despite Mason’s attestations, his sincerity was dubious since he owned approximately three 
hundred slaves.193 This discrepancy between pronouncement and action, Ellsworth argued, 
indicated that Mason’s objection to the Importation Clause was based on his interest in 
maintaining high prices for slaves sold through  the domestic slave market in Virginia, which the 
importation of Africans was likely to depress.194
Not all opponents of the slave trade were so calculating. Many antifederalists genuinely 
sought to prevent the Constitution’s ratification because it would sanction the international trade 
in human cargo. One tract drew empathic attention to the plight of kidnaped Africans. What man, 
rhetorically asked the tract, would allow sons and daughters to be torn from him and doomed to 
hereditary slavery.195 The argument gave no credence to the claim that the importation of slaves 
was critical to Georgia and South Carolina to recoup the property losses of their residents during 
the War of Independence. No person could be the property of another since each was the 
proprietor of himself;196 therefore, no one had any basis for claiming compensation for the loss of 
slaves. Joshua Altherton, in New Hampshire, proclaimed that having the Importation Clause in 
the Constitution would make all states “consenters to, and partakers in, the sin and guilt of this 
abominable traffic.”197 Continuation of slave trade was in fact not exclusively the South’s fault. 
New Englanders and New Yorkers continued to participate in the shipping ventures across the 
Atlantic.198
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The Thirteenth Amendment was essential for ending slave importation in the United 
States. The Slave Importation Clause was no prohibition to the trade; it simply made the 
commerce immune until 1808 from congressional action. Article 5 even prohibited Congress was 
amending the Slave Importation Clause. After 1808, there was still a clamor reinstating the slave 
trade. Even though Congress passed laws in 1818 and 1820 that severely punished participants of 
the slave trade,199 calls for reopening the trade continued until the Civil War. At that time, 
supporters of the slave trade, particularly those from South Carolina and Louisiana, sought to 
decrease slave prices by flooding the market and thereby reducing the costs associated with 
labor.200 Only a constitutional abolition of slavery could conclusively put an end to the trade in 
human chattel.
The Three-Fifths Clause,201 was more politically significant than the Importation Clause. 
Southerners relied on it from the first national election to gain disproportionate federal power.202
By 1803, the South had three more representatives in Congress and twenty-one more electoral 
college votes than the North, and this even though New York and New England had some sixty 
thousand more free inhabitants than the entire South.203 Southern gains through the Louisiana 
purchase further increased this imbalance.204 The representative majority favored slavery. It gave 
Southerners and their allies the power to offer proslavery bills for congressional debate and the 
numbers to enact them into law.
The  Three-Fifths Clause also affected executive office. Paul Finkelman has pointed out 
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that Clause impacted presidential elections. Article II, section 1, clause 2 granted each state 
presidential electors whose number was equal to the states’ combined number of senators and 
representatives.205 The electors, who compose the body that votes for the president, played a 
consequential role in placing slaveholders rather than principled anti-slavery advocates into the 
executive branch, as happened in 1800 when Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams for the 
presidency,206 and in seating Northerners willing to placate the slave South, as was the case with 
James Buchanan’s victory in 1856 over the Republican candidate.
Records of the Constitutional Convention reveal little opposition to the Three-Fifths 
Clause, indicating that the Thirteenth Amendment founders had a more inclusive vision of 
freedom than their revolutionary counterparts.
Southern delegates had wanted an even more favorable constitutional provision than the 
Three-Fifths Clause but were unable to muster the votes to get it. Pinckney and Pierce Butler, 
who both represented South Carolina, sought to count blacks and whites equally for 
representation,207 while granting them no opportunity for political participation. North Carolina 
delegate William R. Davie held equally strong convictions. He asserted that North Carolina 
“would never confederate on any terms” unless at least the three-fifths formula was adopted.208
Speaking on behalf of Virginia, Governor Edmund J. Randolph chimed in for the adoption of the 
Clause as a means of protecting slave property.209
In opposition to the strong-arm tactics of the Deep South, James Wilson of Pennsylvania 
pointed out the absurdity of designating slaves property but using no other chattel but human 
chattel for representation.210 Another Pennsylvania representative, Gouverneur Morris, was more 
acerbic in his criticism. He refused to encourage those who profited from the slave trade “by 
allowing them a representation for their Negroes.”211 Relying on natural rights principles, he 
reeled at the idea that any “inhabitant of Georgia and S.C. who goes to the coast of Africa, and in 
defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest 
connections and dam[n]s them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. 
Instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the citizens of Pa or N. Jersey who views 
with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.”212 He regarded slavery as a vestige of aristocracy 
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that the proposed Clause would require the North to defend militarily.213
No other Northern delegate was as principled as Morrison. Most favored unification to 
disunion and saw concession to slave power as a necessary means of gaining Southern 
concessions. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, for instance, considered the slave trade “iniquitous” 
but refused to vote against the passage of the Three-Fifths Clause into the proposed 
constitution.214
Other constitutional provisions guarded slave owners against recalcitrant slaves and 
required federal involvement in maintaining the peculiar institution. The Insurrection Clause215
gave Congress power to call up the militia to suppress revolts, including slave rebellions such as 
the Nat Turner Rebellion. Another constitutional provision, The Fugitive Slave Clause, made 
“the whole land one vast hunting ground for men,” making felons out of persons who broke the 
fetters of slavery.216 There was not a single dissenting vote to protest passage of the Fugitive 
Slave Clause. Before the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified, it required that fugitives be 
returned “on demand” and prohibited free states from liberating them.217 The amendment 
provision in Article V required two-thirds of both congressional houses to propose the 
amendment and three-fourths of state legislatures or conventions to ratify it. This made the 
passage of an anti-slavery amendment wholly impossible in the United States before the Civil 
War, since, in 1860, slavery was legal in fifteen of the thirty-three states then in the Union.218
The extent to which constitutional protections of slavery compromised the revolutionary 
aspirations for freedom required a change greater than could be accomplished by the simple 
abolition of physical bondage and forced labor. The Thirteenth Amendment altered all civil 
conditions related to slavery. The Abolition Amendment liberated the entire Constitution. It 
rendered all clauses directly dealing with slavery null and altered the meaning of other clauses, 
213
 2 FARRAND ED., RECORDS, supra note ---------, at 222.
214
 2 FARRAND ED., RECORDS, supra note ---------, at 220-21.
215 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 15.
216
 Frederick Douglass, The Constitution & Slavery, in 1 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE 
AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950) (first published in THE 
NORTH STAR, Mar. 16, 1849).
217 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
218
 In 1860, there were fifteen slave states and eighteen free states. Robert R. Russel, The 
General Effects of Slavery Upon Southern Economic Progress, 4 J. S. HIST. 34, 40 (1938); Paul 
Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal Development, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1009, 1024 (1993). See also Samuel Marcosson, Colorizing the Constitution of 
Originalism: Clarence Thomas At the Rubicon, 16 L. & INEQ. 429, 469 (1998) (arguing that Art. 
V can be viewed as “the Framers’ insurance policy against the possibility that then-excluded 
groups, including women, blacks and free blacks, could one day change the power structure the 
Founders had erected without regard for the needs, views, and priorities of the members of those 
groups”).
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such as the Insurrection Clause, to exclude their original design. The Thirteenth Amendment 
further relied on the abolitionist conviction that the Declaration of Independence guaranteed 
universal human rights to citizens, regardless of their race.
IV. Abolitionist Influences
Those abolitionists who called for the immediate end to chattel slavery traced their 
notions of liberty to revolutionary ideology on fundamental rights. Abolitionists drew their ideas 
from revolutionaries who, like Benjamin Rush and James Otis, argued that blacks deserve the 
same privileges and immunities as any other American. As early as 1833, at the inception of the 
radical abolitionist movement, the American Anti-Slavery Society announced its affinity for the 
founders’ ideals but renounced their political enterprise because of the concessions to slavery.219
The Society considered the grievances of constitutional fathers to be trifling when compared to 
those of enslaved victims.220 Radical Republicans eventually incorporated abolitionist natural 
rights rhetoric into the Thirteenth Amendment and gave Congress the power, through the 
enforcement clause, to pass any laws necessary for the protection of equal liberty.221
A. Abolitionist Views on Liberty 
The Thirteenth Amendment’s founders, just as abolitionists, whether they were radical 
constitutionalists and Garrisonians,222 traced their campaign against slavery to the colonial 
struggle for independence. Garrison, a prolific, radical abolitionist, regarded immediate abolition 
219
 American Anti-Slavery Society, Declaration of the Anti- Slavery Convention, Dec. 4, 
1833, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12, 12-
13 (1833).
220
 American Anti-Slavery Society, Declaration of the Anti- Slavery Convention, Dec. 4, 
1833, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12, 13 
(1833).
221 See WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 274-75 (1977) (explaining that radical constitutionalism influenced the 
natural rights theory that Republicans eventually made part of their constitutional agenda).
222
 Both of these groups called for an immediate end to slavery. They differed in their 
views of the original Constitution. Radical constitutionalists believed that the Constitution 
forbade slavery and the Garrisonians believed that it legitimized slavery. Radical 
constitutionalists, such as Lysander Spooner, Frederick Douglass, and Charles Sumner, argued 
that, read correctly, the Fifth Amendment required immediate abolition. See Timothy Sandefur, 
Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 498 (2004). 
William Lloyd Garrison, on the other hand, considered the Constitution the covenant with death. 
Resolution Adopted by the Antislavery Society, Jan. 27, 1843, quoted in WALTER M. MERRILL, 
AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963).
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art9
41
to be implicit in the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence.223 He and other 
nineteenth-century abolitionists relied on the Declaration for developing a republican agenda of 
national reform.
The exploitation of slaves, as they saw it, violated Congress’s obligation under the 
General Welfare Clause to act for the betterment of all United States citizens.224 Slavery, so ran 
this rather utilitarian argument, violated the Preamble’s declared purpose to promote the general 
welfare by securing the blessings of liberty.225 The national government violated its 
constitutional obligation to institute impartial laws for the general welfare by its failure to stop 
the exploitation of hundreds of thousands of laborers. Radical abolitionists recognized the 
nation’s founders had “separated from the mother country” and had declared independence in 
order to resist “the attempt of Great Britain to impose on them a political slavery.”226 Slavery was 
incompatible with the goals of the Revolution and with the founders’ statement of them in the 
Declaration.
Many abolitionists regarded the Declaration as a statement of congressional obligation to 
protect natural rights against arbitrary exploitation. The abolitionists adopted the creed that 
natural rights were intrinsic to citizenship. And citizenship to them was the birthright of all those 
alive in the United States at the time of the revolution and all those who had thereafter been born 
in the United States.227 Their political rhetoric extolled the American project to protect human 
rights. Natural rights, argued numerous abolitionist publications, are intrinsic to individuals and 
precede society. Civil societies, explained Unitarian abolitionist William E. Channing, are 
organized to protect those rights.228
223 See WILLIAM L. GARRISON, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE OLD COLONY ANTI-
SLAVERY SOCIETY, AT SOUTH SCITUATE, MASS., JULY 4, 1839, at 17 (1839) (“if we advocate 
gradual abolition, we shall perpetuate what we aim to destroy, and proclaim that the self-evident 
truths of the Declaration of Independence are self-evident lies”).
224 See, e.g., GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SLAVERY 62 (1841) (asserting that the United states compact “is a declaration before the world, 
and this nation has committed itself, that this country shall be ruled by impartial laws, and that 
the congress of the United States shall consult in all things the general welfare of the people”).
225
 An example of this line of reasoning is found in CHARLES OLCOTT, TWO LECTURES ON 
SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 88 (1838). Olcott considered slavery to be against “the whole spirit” of 
the Preamble. Id.
226 GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
55, 63 (1841). 
227 See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN 
SLAVERY 91, 93 (1849).
228 WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 21 (Edward C. Osborn: reprint 1836). Channing, as 
other abolitionists, was philosophically inclined to the views of John Locke. See JACOBUS 
TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 94 (Collier Books 1965) (1951) (writing that the abolitionist 
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Many members of the Reconstruction Congress later expressed a similar perspective of 
fundamental rights during debates on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment.229 Slavery was the 
deprivation of those rights, and, following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Congress could provide redress against intrusions on civil liberties. Reconstructions based their 
understanding of freedom, in large part, on abolitionist views.
For the Reconstruction Congress as for abolitionists, slavery was the worst of all 
robberies because it misappropriated people’s toils, talents, and strengths.230 Not only did slavery 
infringe on people’s vocational choices; it also deprived them of their right to transit, fair trial, 
and bodily integrity.231 The right to own and alienate property was likewise essential to human 
happiness, and the ownership of humans went against common, human nature.232 Slavery also 
prevented people in bondage from entering into binding agreements. According to some 
antislavery advocates, such as Lysander Spooner, even without an abolition amendment, the 
Contract Clause of the original Constitution prohibited states from passing slave codes because 
constitutionalism was based on Lockeian and Jeffersonian principles). Abolitionists also relied 
on religious convictions. See Declaration of Sentiments of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 
Philadelphia. 1833, available at <http://www.civnet.org/resources/teach/basic/part4/18.ht> (last 
visited May 25, 2004) (“all those laws which are now in force, admitting the right of slavery, are 
therefore, before God, utterly null and void; being an audacious usurpation of the Divine 
prerogative, a daring infringement on the law of nature, a base overthrow of the very foundations 
of the social compact, a complete extinction of all the relations, endearments and obligations of 
mankind, and a presumptuous transgression of all the holy commandments; and that therefore 
they ought instantly to be abrogated”).
229 See supra Part -----. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 695 (2002) 
(stating that the Reconstruction Congress intended the Reconstruction Amendments to protect 
fundamental rights); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History & to It: An Impossible 
Dream?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1663, 1664 (1997) (postulating that the constitutional theory of 
the Reconstruction Congress guaranteed fundamental rights).
230 WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 30-31 (Edward C. Osborn: reprint 1836).
231 RUSSEL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY 
CONTROVERSY 1830-1860, at 197 (1949) (discussing an abolitionist concept of rights in the 
context of the movement against fugitive slave law).
232 See Brougham, The Liberator, Jan. 22, 1831, LIBERATOR, at 13, cl. 1 (“talk not of 
property of the planter in his slaves . . . The principles, the feelings of our common nature, rise in 
rebellion against it”); American Anti-Slavery Society, Declaration of the Anti- Slavery 
Convention, Dec. 4, 1833, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT 
PHILADELPHIA 12, 14 (1833) (“man cannot hold property in man”). Abolitionists, like those in 
Oberlin College and the Noyes Academy, wanted nothing less than to enable blacks to become 
educated and prosperous. SAMUEL J. MAY, SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF OUR ANTI-SLAVERY 
CONFLICT 29 (1869).
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they infringed on the natural right to contract.233
Slavery withheld inalienable rights, which are common to all persons.234 Theodore Parker 
and other abolitionist authors located the right to live a free and happy life in the Declaration of 
Independence and in the Preamble.235 That right, and any of complementary inalienable rights, 
was guaranteed equally for all, regardless of their race.236 The national government’s obligation 
to abolition slavery required that it pass laws providing for an equality of “civil and political 
rights and privileges.”237
The existence of a United States covenant to protect equal rights was quintessential to 
abolitionist understanding of national government. The Declaration, especially, was the 
cornerstone of the “temple of freedom” for which “[a]t the sound of their trumpet-call, three 
millions of people rose up as from the sleep of death, and rushed to the strife of blood; deeming it 
more glorious to die instantly as freemen, than desirable to live an hour as slaves.”238 When the 
revolutionary generation denied to Great Britain the right and power to violate the colonists’ 
privilege to enjoy their natural rights, that generation, according to constitutional attorney Joel 
Tiffany, precluded their newly formed government to countenance enslavement.239
Abolitionist belief that the Declaration was a fundamental law of the United States 
overlooked that documents lack of enforcement provision.240 The Enforcement clause of the 
Thirteenth Amendment would eventually fill that deficiency.
To radical constitutionalists, who disagreed with the radical abolitionist indictment of the 
original Constitution, it appeared that some constitutional provisions did prohibit slavery. 
233 LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 98-99 (1845).
234 Principles of the Anti-Slavery Society, in THE AMERICAN ANTI SLAVERY ALMANAC
30-31 (1837 ed.) (“It is for the rights of MAN that we are contending–the rights of ALL men–our 
own rights–the rights of our neighbor–the liberties of our country–of our posterity–of our fellow 
men–of all nations, and of all future generations.”).
235 See Theodore Parker, The Dangers from Slavery (July 2, 1854), in 4 OLD SOUTH 
LEAFLETS 1-3 (1897).
236 See WILLIAM GOODELL, ADDRESS OF THE MACEDON CONVENTION 3 (1847).
237 Constitution of the New-England Anti-Slavery Society, in 1 THE ABOLITIONIST: OR 
RECORD OF THE NEW ENGLAND ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 2 (January 1833).
238
 American Anti-Slavery Society, Declaration of the Anti- Slavery Convention, Dec. 4, 
1833, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA 12, 12 
(1833).
239 JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 29 
(1849).
240 See Liberty Party Platform of 1844, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-
1960, at 5 (Donald B. Johnson eds., 1978).
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Primarily, they relied on the Guarantee Clause to assert the United States obligation to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of all persons born within any States.241 For them, a government that 
countenance slavery in any state was succumbing to an oligarchy of arbitrary disenfranchisement 
and enslavement, neither of which were compatible with a republican form of government.242
The social order of owning slaves was incompatible with a polity committed to the protection of 
civil liberties through representation. Slavery was analogous to the despotism against which the 
colonies rebelled. Slavocracy was conducive to a concentration of power that can harm basic 
liberties.243
B. Abolitionist Influence on Thirteenth Amendment Debates 
Abolitionists deeply influenced Reconstruction Republican thought. Several of the 
principal congressional leaders during the Thirteenth Amendment debates had long been 
committed to abolitionism. Representative Thaddeus Stevens, had actively participated in 
abolitionism from his early years when he represented fugitive slaves for free. He entered politics 
in 1849, at age fifty-seven, in response to the agitation over slavery after the cession of Mexican 
lands.244 Stevens was the chairman of the powerful Committee on the Ways and Means during 
the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and, later, the Committee on Appropriations during 
the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Senator Charles Sumner was another early convert to abolitionism. Sumner’s convictions 
against slavery were born of his experience with its unyielding practices and ideology. He had 
been an involved abolitionist since 1835, when he first subscribed to Garrison’s Liberator.245
Sumner was the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations throughout the debates on the 
Thirteenth Amendment and on the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
241 See, e.g., Alvan Stewart, Argument, on the Question Whether the New Constitution of 
1844 Abolished Slavery in New Jersey, in WRITINGS & SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART, ON 
SLAVERY 272, 336-37 (Luther R. Marsh ed., 1860) (“a republican form of government was born 
free and equal, and entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This, we knew, would by 
force of this provision in the constitution of the United States, if faithfully honored, blot out 
slavery from every State constitution”).
242 See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 106 (1845).
243
 For a more detailed discussion of this point see DANIEL J. MCINERNEY, THE 
FORTUNATE HEIRS OF FREEDOM: ABOLITION & REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 16-17 (1994).
244 JAMES F. RHODES, 5 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850,
541- 44 (1904); 1 JAMES G. BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS: FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 
WITH A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION OF 1860, at 25 
(1884); WILLIAM L. RICHTER, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION, 1862-1877, at 371-72 (1996).
245 1 JAMES F. RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 
TO THE FINAL RESTORATION OF HOME RULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877, 227-28 (1892).
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Both Stevens and Sumner brought the natural rights tradition to the debates on the 
Thirteenth Amendment and made those principles a part of the Constitution. Sumner’s arguments 
against passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill were representative of the ideas he continued to 
espouse during the debates on the Thirteenth Amendment. “Slavery,” he stated in one speech, “is 
an infraction of the immutable law of nature, and, as such, cannot be considered a natural 
incident to any sovereignty, especially in a country which has solemnly declared, in its 
Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right of all men to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”246
During the Civil War, many Republicans adopted radical abolitionist principles about the 
federal government’s obligation to eradicate slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment’s grant of 
power to Congress over matters resembling the incidents of servitude signaled a break from 
moderate anti-slavery leanings.247 Moderates wanted states to gradually and separately end 
slavery. For a short time, at the end of the Civil War, a radical form of abolitionism held the reins 
of Congress.248
President Lincoln, abandoned gradualism by 1863 and eventually supported immediate 
abolition through the Thirteenth Amendment.249 He had embraced natural rights philosophy years 
before he sat in the oval office.250 Lincoln believed that the Declaration’s guarantees applied 
equally to whites and blacks.251 He asserted that blacks were never meant to be excluded from 
the human rights guarantees of the Declaration.252
The Declaration’s recognition that “all men are created equal” influenced a generation of 
Republicans, who like Lincoln, played vital roles in passing the proposed Thirteenth Amendment 
246 CONG. GLOBE, 33rd  Cong., 1st Sess., Appendix 268 (Feb. 24, 1854).
247 DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE & THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, & 
LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 98-99 (1993).
248 See text accompanying notes ----- {dealing with Radical leadership in the 38th
Congress}.
249 See supra text accompanying notes ----.
250
 Lincoln’s earliest recorded indictment of slavery came during a speech about 
mobocracy on January 27, 1838 before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois. 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1832-1858: SPEECHES, LETTERS, AND 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 28 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., Lib. 
Am. 1989).
251
  Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James N. Brown (Oct. 18, 1858), in 3 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 327 (Roy P. Basler et al. ed., 1953).
252 Speech at New Haven, Conn., in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 16-
17 (Roy P. Basler et al. ed., 1953) (Mar. 6, 1860) (“To us it appears natural to think that slaves 
are human beings; men, not property; that some of the things, at least, stated about men in the 
Declaration of Independence apply to them as well as to us.”)
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through Congress. They intended the Thirteenth Amendment to protect the self-evident natural 
rights to which the Declaration had committed national government. This perspective appears 
repeatedly in the Congressional debates on the proposed Amendment.
A Representative, who advocated passage of the Amendment, regarded it as the legal 
means for ending a variety of injustices connected to slavery:
What vested rights so high or so sacred as a man’s right to himself, to his wife and 
children, to his liberty, and to the fruits of his own industry? Did not our fathers 
declare that those rights were inalienable? And if a man cannot himself alienate 
those rights, how I can another man alienate them without being himself a robber 
of the vested rights of his brother-man?”253
Slavery violated principles of the American Revolution that sparked opposition to British 
infringement on American civil liberties. Within this national history, the Thirteenth Amendment 
brought the Constitution, which originally protected the institution of slavery, into harmony with 
the Declaration of Independence.254 As Charles Black pointed out, “The thirteenth amendment 
had lain latent in the Declaration of Independence. . . . The generation that abolished slavery 
made such a choice, as to the matter wherein the hypocrisy of the Declaration had seemed most 
startling. But the Declaration of Independence is still here.”255 Radical Republicans, pursuant to 
their abolitionist roots, altered the Constitution to reflect the practical implications of 
Revolutionary ideology.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides an enforceable right for the protection of those civil 
liberties that until its ratification had been valued but not implemented. The Amendment allows 
Congress to secure liberty, life, and the pursuit of happiness through positive laws.256
The Declaration could only provide an inspirational token for abolitionists and 
Reconstructionists since it did not end slavery and lacked any legal authority to require its 
constitutional protection.257 The Thirteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause became the 
253 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (l865) (Representative Farnsworth).
254 W. R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS: CONGRESS & RECONSTRUCTION 1865 - 1867, at 
267-68 (1963); STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 185-213 (1967) (concerning the question of slavery and the Constitutional 
Convention).
255
 Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 
86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1986).
256 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 ( Jan. 8, 1864) (Godlove S. Orth of 
Indiana).
257
 The remark of Alvan Stewart, an antislavery attorney, on the Declaration is revealing 
of its limited power to alter the status of slavery. His remarks warrant extensive reproduction: 
“The Declaration is a summary of colonial and personal injustice. The sword in seven years cut 
loose the colonies from their bondage. The dismemberment was ratified. Our country took her 
seat at the council board of nations. The young Sovereignty limped up into the temple of nations, 
with the Declaration of Independence spread, in her right hand, with a whip and fetter in her left, 
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constitutional vehicle for ending any vestiges of slavery and involuntary servitude. More 
importantly from a contemporary perspective, the Thirteenth Amendment was the establishment 
of a positive guarantee of freedom into the Constitution. Without the power granted under the 
Thirteenth Amendment, Stevens believed the Constitution had protected slavery and had not 
granted the federal government the power to regulate it.258
Behind its enforceable provisions lies the national commitment to secure personal 
autonomy as the best path to civil welfare. Progressive advocates of the first reconstruction 
amendment made an earnest effort to remove impediments standing in the way of civil rights. 
They regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a means of restoring the natural rights long denied 
to blacks in particular and wage earners in general. According to Radical Republicans, former 
slaves were not only freed from bondage, they also obtained the right to make fundamental 
choices regarding matters affecting their jobs and families. Congressman M. Russell Thayer of 
Pennsylvania expressed the same point in general, rhetorical terms: “What kind of freedom is 
that which is given by the amendment of the Constitution, and if it is confined simply to the 
exemption of the freedom from sale and barter? Do you give freedom to a man when you allow 
him to be deprived of those great natural rights to which every man is entitled by nature?”259
Radical Republicans relied on the Declaration of Independence to elucidate the proposed 
amendment. Representative Godlove S. Orth from Indiana expected the Amendment to “be a 
practical application of that self-evident truth,” of the Declaration “‘that [all men] are endowed 
by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness.’”260 Its more progressive advocates made an “earnest effort” to remove 
impediments standing in the way of human rights.261 Francis W. Kellogg, Representative of 
Michigan, traced the sources of the proposed amendment both to the Declaration and to the 
Constitution’s Preamble, with its requirement that government promote the general welfare and 
secure liberty.262 Illinois Representative Ebon C. Ingersoll, who was elected to the Thirty-eighth 
Congress to fill the vacancy created by the death of legendary abolitionist Owen Lovejoy, voiced 
the desire to secure slaves “natural” and “inalienable” rights because blacks have a right to “live 
followed by a slave, while the blush mantled on her cheek, and revealed the struggles of her 
shame; and what she lacked in the sincerity of intent, she contrived to countervail by a certain 
impudence pretence–and what she lost by force of position, she would fain make up, by the 
ingenuity of her abstractions. Theoretically, the relation of slave and master, king and people, 
was dissolved.” Letter from Alvan Stewart to Dr. [Gamaliel] Bailey, Apr. 1842, in WRITINGS & 
SPEECHES OF ALVAN STEWART, ON SLAVERY 250-51 (Luther R. Marsh ed., 1860).
258 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 265 (Jan. 13, 1865).
259 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (Mar. 2, 1866).
260 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (January 6, 1865).
261 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (Mar. 19, 1864).
262 Id., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 (June 14, 1864).
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in a state of freedom.”263 He asserted that they have a right to profit from their labors and to 
enjoy conjugal happiness without fear of forced separations at the behest of uncompassionate 
masters.264
Representative Thomas T. Davis of New York similarly expounded on the nature of civil 
liberty: “Liberty, that civil and religious liberty which was so clearly beautifully defined in the 
Declaration of Independence. . . . African slavery was regarded as temporary in its character. . . . 
Our fathers predicted that the time would soon come when the interests of the country would 
demand that slavery should pass away.”265 Representative John F. Farnsworth of Illinois thought 
the “old fathers who made the Constitution . . . . believed that slavery was at war with the rights 
of human nature”266; on the other hand, Representative William D. Kelly of Pennsylvania 
thought the “errors” of the Founding Fathers for compromising with wrongs were being expiated 
by blood and agony and death.”
The Thirty-eighth Congress expected the Thirteenth Amendment to provide national 
government with the power to protect fundamental civil liberties. The Amendment’s second 
section placed the power to protect civil rights in the hands of federal legislators, shifting the 
balance of power away from the states. Yet the Supreme Court decisions that followed 
Reconstruction made the Amendment virtually ineffectual, and it was only at the end of the 
twentieth century that the Court corrected itself.
V. The Judiciary on Freedom from Slavery
Abolitionist and revolutionary notions of freedom and slavery have informed 
contemporary Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court’s holdings manifest how the 
judiciary can be carried with the prejudices and aspirations of its times. Its earliest post-
Reconstruction decisions prevented the full implementation of abolitionist ideals, and only the 
Civil Rights movement of the 1960's led to an understanding of liberty approaching that of the 
revolutionary generation. The Warren and Burger Courts’ holdings about the Abolition 
Amendment rejected the racially insular concept of liberty that became a part of the 1787 
Constitution and led to a civil war over slavery.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
Soon after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cases involving the interpretation of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which Congress passed pursuant to its enforcement authority, 
263 Id., 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2990 (June 15, 1864).
264 Id.
265 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154. Likewise during the Senate debate Reverdy 
Johnson, who had represented one of Dred Scott’s owners, argued that had the framer’s known 
how much sectional strife would result from slavery they would have opposed it. N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 6, 1864, at 1.
266 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2978 (June 15, 1864).
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began to proceed through the courts.267 Surveying the legislative history of this statute is critical 
for evaluating the Supreme Court cases that later interpreted it.
During debates preceding the Act’s passage, congressmen continued to rely on the same 
radical abolitionist conception of fundamental rights that they had relied on the year before in 
passing the Thirteenth Amendment. They regarded the protection of civil rights to be a primary 
purpose of government. The Act reflects Congress’s commitment to legal protection for blacks 
that would do more than merely unshackle them from their master control. It explicitly prohibited 
violations against civil rights, such as the right of contracting.268
What’s more, Congress meant to make freedom universal. The Act was primarily 
intended to end injustices against blacks, but it likewise protected the rights of all citizens, 
regardless of their race.269 The universal rights, Senator Sherman explained contained the real 
enjoyment of liberty, not merely the emancipation of slaves, “the right to testify [is] . . . an 
inevitable incident of liberty, without which liberty would be but a name . . . . We should secure 
to these freedmen the right to acquire and hold property, to enjoy the fruits of their own labor, to 
be protected in their homes and family, the right to be educated, and to go and come at pleasure. 
These are among the natural rights of free men.”270
267
 The Reconstruction Congress enacted four statutes pursuant to its Thirteenth 
Amendment power, even before the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 
(1866) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866) (Slave Kidnaping Act); ch. 187, 14 
Stat. 546 (1867) (Peonage Act of 1867); ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (Act of February 5, 1867, expanding 
the scope of habeas corpus statutes). These diverse laws indicate the fallacy of the revisionist 
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment meant no more “for the Negro than exemption from 
slavery.” JAMES Z. GEORGE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 114 
(1915).
268
 In its enacted form, the Act recognized the rights to “make and enforce contracts, to 
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the 
contrary notwithstanding.” The Act further provided them with the “full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property.” It granted federal courts 
jurisdiction to hear cases of any alleged violations. Moreover, anyone who was denied the right 
to enforce his or her rights under the Act in a state court was permitted to transfer the case to a 
federal court. State officials who violated the Act under color of law or pursuant to custom were 
also subject to criminal prosecution. Violators were subject to imprisonment for up to one year 
and a fine of no more than $1,000. Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
269
 Senator Lyman Trumbull, who was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
stated that the Civil Rights Bill, was intended to “guaranty to every person of every color the 
same civil rights.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (Feb. 2, 1866).
270 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (Dec. 13, 1865). Senator Howard held a 
similarly broad construction of the Thirteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom, “what are the 
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The unique opportunity to pass the civil rights legislation came from the 1865 ratification 
of the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. This power changed the federalist 
dynamic between states and the federal government, making Congress, rather than state 
legislatures, the supreme protector of civil liberties. Senator Henry Wilson, who like Sumner and 
Stevens adopted abolitionism far before the Civil War,271 considered civil rights to be “the true 
office of Government to protect” and their possession “by the citizen raises by necessary 
implication the power in Congress to protect them.”272 Senator Sherman found this power even 
more explicitly in the second section of the Thirteenth Amendment: it “is not only a guarantee of 
liberty to every inhabitant of the United States, but an express grant of power to Congress to 
secure this liberty by appropriate legislation.”273 The Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress 
the enforcement authority it needed to authorize enactments on behalf of the nation’s citizenry.274
Given the extensive congressional record of debates about the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, radical Congressmen might have believed they had altered the 
dynamic of American politics and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court soon thwarted their 
expectations in a series of decisions that showed little care for protecting fundamental rights, 
instead, opting for sectional reconciliation.
B. Early Judicial Interpretation 
The earliest interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 boded well for ending practices 
associated with slavery and involuntary servitude. United States v. Rhodes275 was the first federal 
decision on the constitutionality of the Act. Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne,276 presiding 
attributes of a freeman according to the universal understanding of the American people? Is a 
freeman to be deprived of the right of acquiring property, of the right of having a family, a wife, 
children, home? What definition will you attach to the word ‘freeman’ that does not include these 
ideas?” Id. at 504 (Jan. 30, 1866). Any lesser guarantee of freedom, Howard asserted, would be 
worse than the bondage from which blacks emerged. Id.
271
 On Senator Wilson’s longstanding commitment to ending slavery see 2 ALLAN 
NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION 412-413 (1947) and WILLIAM R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS
1865-1867, at 83-84 (1963).
272 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118, 1119 (Mar. 1, 1866).
273 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (Dec. 13, 1865).
274
 Robert J. Kaczorowski has made the similar point. Kaczorowski has pointed out that
Dred Scott had made the natural rights theory of the Declaration unenforceable without the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War & Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 863, 894-95 (1986).
275
 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866).
276
 Swayne was an established abolitionist even before the Civil War, at one time he and 
his wife freed slaves they received by marriage. Joseph Fletcher Brennan, 1 THE (OHIO) 
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over the case as a designated circuit court justice, held the Thirteenth Amendment empowered 
Congress to pass the Act and federal courts to adjudicate cases arising out of it. The white 
defendant was charged with committing burglary against Nancy Talbot, “a citizen of the United 
States of the African race.”277 The case was litigated in a federal district court because Kentucky 
law forbade blacks from testifying against whites in state courts.278 In dictum, Swayne posited 
that without congressional power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, “simple abolition, 
would have been a phantom of delusion.”279 Granting federal courts subject matter jurisdiction 
over civil rights cases was critical for ending the incidents of servitude since it made judicial 
redress available where it was foreclosed in state courts.
The Supreme Court ruled very differently in Blyew v. United States. Even though it 
addressed procedural matters rather than substantive ones, Blyew was the beginning of a judicial 
trend that downplayed the Thirteenth Amendment’s pertinence to revolutionary and abolitionist 
notions of freedom. It was the first blow to the use of the Thirteenth Amendment for ending 
centuries of racial intolerance. Blyew, like Rhodes, was a federal removal case. The two 
defendants were indicted in 1868, at a time when Kentucky still forbade black witnesses from 
testifying against whites.280
Both the oral and physical evidence showed that in one night John Blyew and George 
Kennard murdered three generations of a black family.281 The case had been removed to district 
court pursuant to section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.282 Section 3 of the Act permitted 
removal “of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in 
the courts or judicial tribunals of the State, or locality where they may be.”283 The United States 
Solicitor General argued that the right to testify protected persons and property and was a 
BIOGRAPHICAL CYCLOPEDIA AND PORTRAIT GALLERY 101 (1880). As an attorney, Swayne had 
even represented several fugitive slaves. William Gillette, Noah H. Swayne, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1978: THEIR LIVES & MAJOR OPINIONS 990 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds. 1980). His most famous representation came in the Oberlin rescue 
cases, involving the Fugitive Slave Law. Ex parte Bushnell, 8 Ohio St. 599 (1858) and Ex parte 
Bushnell v. Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859).
277 Id. at 786.
278 Id. at 785.
279 Id. at 794.
280 Blyew, 80 U.S. at 581, citing 1860 Ky. Acts, § 1, ch. 104, vol. 2, at 470. The law only 
permitted blacks and Native Americans to act as “competent witnesses” in civil suits to which 
the only parties were blacks or Native Americans. Id. at 581.
281 Murder: Particulars of the Late Tragedy in Lewis County, LOUISVILLE (KY.) DAILY J., 
Sept. 9, 1868, at 3.
282 See id. at 597 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
283 See id. at 597 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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freedom the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to secure for all citizens regardless of 
their race.284
The Court found that the Act only gave a federal court removal jurisdiction when a state 
prohibited blacks from testifying in a case that might affect their personal, relative, or property 
rights.285 In Blyew, the Court held that the federal court had no jurisdiction to hear the case 
because the murder had not directly affected the two surviving witnesses to the crime, who were 
both black.286 The Court considered it irrelevant that even if the black victims had survived the 
assault, they could not have testified in a Kentucky court against the white suspects.287 Litigation 
could no longer affect the murdered; therefore, the Court reversed the defendants’ federal 
convictions without remanding the case.
Justice Bradley wrote the dissenting opinion to Blyew, criticizing the majority’s “narrow” 
reading of the Civil Rights Act and its disregard for the liberal ideals surrounding the statute’s 
passage.288 Bradley argued that Congress broadly intended to prevent wanton, racist conduct 
from being committed against the black community.289 The Amendment attempted to “do away 
with the incidents and consequences of slavery” and to replace them with “civil liberty and 
equality.”290 The dissent concluded further that the the Abolition Amendment’s primary aim was 
to instate blacks to the “full enjoyment” of civil rights.291 He also recognized that the majority 
opinion legitimized Kentucky’s practice of prohibiting blacks from testifying against whites; 
thereby, the state branded all blacks “with a badge of slavery.”292
While Blyew involved a procedural matter, the Civil Rights Cases initiated a substantive 
period of decline. Bradley drafted the majority opinion. He qualified his earlier dissent in Blyew, 
essentially abandoning Radical Reconstructionist aspirations to animate the Declaration of 
Independence’s statement of equal freedom.
The Civil Rights Cases evaluated the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,293
284 Id. at 589.
285 Id. at 592-93. 
286 Id. at 593.
287 Id. at 593-94.
288
. See id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
289 Id. at 595 (Bradley, J. dissenting).
290
. See id. at 601, 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
291
. See id. at 601 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
292
. See id. at 599 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
293
 The full name of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was “An act to protect all citizens in 
their civil and legal rights.” 18 Stat. 335.
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the Reconstruction Congress’s last piece of civil rights legislation.294 By the time the case came 
before the Supreme Court, in 1883, Reconstruction had ground to a halt despite the many 
remaining institutions and practices that resembled involuntary servitude. Among these racialist 
institutions were segregation, peonage, the use of adhesion contracts for sharecropping, and the 
convict lease system.295
The Civil Rights Cases involved five joint cases from various parts of the country. The 
first four were reviews of criminal prosecutions. Two of the defendants had been charged with 
denying blacks access to an inn or hotel, a third with prohibiting a black individual access to the 
dress circle of a theater in San Francisco, another with refusing someone access to a New York 
opera house. The fifth case was a civil case from Tennessee involving a railroad company whose 
conductor denied a black woman access to “ride in the ladies’ car.”296 Attorneys for four of the 
five defendants did not even bother coming to argue the cases before the Court.297 The Court 
nevertheless handed their clients a favorable ruling that was rooted in the emerging national 
consensus against sweeping civil rights reform.
The decision had far ranging implications on congressional Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement powers. The effects have been so long lasting that two recent Supreme 
Court opinions relied on the Civil Rights Cases’s holding to diminish congressional civil rights 
powers.298
294 See Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1, 22 (1995) (discussing debate about Reconstruction that arose in passing Civil Rights Act 
of 1875). Concerning Charles Sumner’s centrality in securing passage of the Act see JAMES M. 
MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP 16, 20-21 
(2d ed. 1995); ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 226 (1990). Benjamin 
Butler, the manager of the Bill in the House, described his task as defending “the rights of these 
men who have given their blood for me and my country.” Id. On the role of President Ulysses 
Grant in the controversy see WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE, ULYSSES S. GRANT, POLITICIAN 368-71 
(1935).
295
 One author recently found that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, as many as one-
third of all sharecropping farmers “were being held against their will in 1900.” JACQUELINE 
JONES, THE DISPOSSESSED 107 (1992). On the convict lease system see David Oshinsky’s WORSE 
THAN SLAVERY (1996). See also KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH REBELLION: THE BATTLE 
AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COAL FIELDS, 1871-1896 (1998); ALEX 
LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONVICT LABOR 
IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996).
296 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4-5.
297 LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES & THE NEGRO 137-38 (1966).
298 United States v. Morrison relied on the Civil Rights Cases for the proposition that 
Congress can only prohibit state actions through its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.  
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
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In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that Congress had overstepped its Fourteenth 
Amendment power when it prohibited private place of accommodation discrimination.299 The 
Court, therefore, found the first two sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be 
unconstitutional. In the unreconstructed South, the idea that states would regulate private 
discriminations was farfetched. Bradley made an artificial dichotomy, although one that was 
common in post-Reconstruction United States, between civil rights and social rights. In the Civil 
Rights Cases, he held that the Fourteenth Amendment covered the former, which included 
making contracts and leasing land, but not social rights, which pertained to using public 
accommodations.300 Thus, as Angela P. Harris pointed out, “[t]he Court had curtailed the power 
to protect American citizens against racial domination in the name of federalism.”301
The only member of the Court who disagreed with the majority was Justice John 
Marshall Harlan. His view of congressional enforcement power was analogous to Radical 
Republican principles of Reconstruction. It relied on a conception of freedom that was derived 
from revolutionary and abolitionist thought. The fifth section of the Amendment, Harlan wrote in 
dissent, enabled Congress to enact any “appropriate legislation” to prohibit states, individuals, 
and corporations from discriminating on account of race.
The Civil Rights Cases were also brought pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. The 
Supreme Court’s holding was the first substantive interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
guarantee of liberty. The Court recognized that the Amendment went somewhat farther than 
simply releasing slaves from their masters’ control.302 In fact, Bradley reiterated his conviction 
that the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the power to pass all laws “necessary and 
U.S. 507, 524 (1997). See also Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, & 
Unprincipled Neutrality Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 1333-34 (2003) (stating that the 
current Court continues to follow the  Civil Rights Cases holding on the restraints of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power).
299 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“It is State action of a particular character that is 
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It 
has a deeper and broader scope”); id. at 18 (“This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and 
direct; it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns, 
public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation on 
the same subject, or only allows it permissive force.”). 
300 See James W. Fox Jr., Re-Readings & Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or 
Immunities, & Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 KY. L.J. 67, 160 (2002-2003) (explaining 
the distinction made, during the mid-nineteenth century between social, civil, and political 
rights).
301
 Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness & Difference in Twentieth-Century 
Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1961 (2000).
302 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20.
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proper for the obliteration and prevention of slavery, with all its badges and incidents.” 303
Bradley even conceded that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibited state and private violations.304
The Court, however, rejected the claim that by denying equal access to public accommodation, 
the defendants practices were vestiges of servitude.305
The Court again differentiated between social rights and the “fundamental rights which 
appertain to the essence of citizenship.”306 The ruling thereby limited congressional Thirteenth 
Amendment power to the protection of civil and political rights. Federal legislation could only 
end practices directly related to institutional slavery; including, impediments against black court 
testimony and property ownership.307 Based on this line of reasoning, the Court held that 
Congress had overreached its Thirteenth Amendment authority when it passed the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 to prohibit social discrimination.308
Bradley’s dismissiveness of the extent to which a public carrier can infringe on civil 
liberties through exclusionary social practices left virtually no recourse against segregation. 
Social discrimination limited the plaintiffs’ ability to travel comfortably, enjoy an opera, reserve 
a room at an inn, or watch a play. Such bigotry degraded victims and marked them with a badge 
of inferiority. Social exclusion disempowered blacks from exercising preferences and 
perpetuated the white supremacism that was intrinsically linked to slavery. The Court’s holding 
in the Civil Rights Cases showed a callousness about the private and public impediments that 
prevented blacks, even after abolition, from enjoying the freedom of citizenship. Bradley’s 
dismissive opinion in the Civil Rights Cases furthered the social tensions and misery that the 
Radical Republicans expected Congress to end through the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth 
303 Id. at 20-21.
304 Id. at 20.
305 Id. at 25.
306 Id. at 22. Bradley went on to say that the Thirteenth Amendment “simply abolished 
slavery” while the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibited the states from abridging the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” See id. at 23. His conclusions deviate from his 
dissent to Blyew v. United States, see supra text accompanying notes -------, where he recognized 
Congress’ power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
indicate that congressmen regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as a conduit of equal rights 
legislation. See George A. Schell, Note, Open Housing: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. & Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 556 (1969) (discussing the courts differentiation between 
social and civil rights).
307 See id. at 22.
308
 Bradley put this point in the form of a reductio ad absurdum: “It would be running the 
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person 
may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his 
coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other matters of intercourse 
or business.” Id. at 24-25.
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Amendment. Homegrown militias, such as the KKK, and private business owners who refused to 
provide blacks with goods and services were now protected by state indifference or outright 
support for their practices.309
In dissent, Justice Harlan understood the Court to be countenancing state sponsored 
abridgements of freedom.310 The majority’s opinion, he argued, was “narrow and artificial” and 
inimical to the “substance and spirit” of the Thirteenth Amendment.311 Harlan understood that 
since the dogma of black inferiority was integral to maintaining slavery, the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom required the federal government to pass laws punishing the 
abridgment of freedom, especially when that abridgment was based on racism.312 This principle, 
for Harlan, carried a practical implication:
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that amendment, by 
appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect that people against the 
deprivation, on account of their race, of any civil rights enjoyed by other freemen 
in the same state; and such legislation may be of a direct and primary character, 
operating upon states, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield power and 
authority under the state.313
While Justice Harlan agreed with Justice Bradley that Congress could not regulate social rights, 
he proclaimed that the rights the Civil Rights Act of 1875 protected were civil since the use of 
public accommodations was an intrinsic aspect of civic life.314
After the Civil Rights Cases, the Thirteenth Amendment was relegated to virtual disuse. 
Indeed, the Court continued to chip away at the limited use of its enforcement powers that 
Congress had exercised before the collapse of Reconstruction. Following the Civil Rights Cases, 
309
. See id. at 25. Bradley explicitly argued that equal access to public amenities is 
unconnected to the enjoyment of fundamental rights: “There were thousands of free colored 
people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, 
liberty, and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any 
invasion of their personal status as freemen because they were not admitted to all the privileges 
enjoyed by white citizens, or because they were subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of 
accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement.” Id.
310 See id. at 54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
311
. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
312 See id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“I do hold that since slavery, as the court has 
repeatedly declared, was the moving or principal cause of the adoption of that amendment, and 
since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, of those held in bondage, their 
freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, all discrimination against 
them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other races.”).
313 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
314
 Id. at 56 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the Court maintained the distinction between social and civil rights in Plessy v. Ferguson.315 This 
step showed judicial aversion for abolitionist notions of freedom and equality.316 In finding that 
separate public accommodations did not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court quoted the 
Civil Rights Cases for the proposition that the end of slavery did not require anyone to socially 
deal with other races in “matters of intercourse or business.”317 The opinion in Plessy took a 
literalist approach to slavery, attacking the assumption that the enforced separation of the two 
races stamped African Americans with a badge of inferiority.318 Justice Brown’s narrow 
construction of “slavery” was far removed from the broad revolutionary notions of freedom, 
regarding strictly as a matter of forced labor. He ignored the American revolutionary tradition, 
which abolitionists and Radial Republicans had adopted, that real freedom meant far more than 
simply being able to choose an employer. It meant being able to participate in the life of the 
community, especially in political matters, which segregation made virtually inaccessible to 
blacks.
Just as in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan wrote the dissent to Plessy. He regarded 
the right of persons to share railroad cars to be inherent in the concept of liberty.319 Curiously, 
while the majority’s understanding of liberty in a civil society was significantly more reserved 
than the founders’, Harlan’s perspective was not only more expansive than that of the founders’ 
but even that of abolitionists. From his standpoint, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Harlan 
understood better than the politicians and theorists that came before him that a segregated society 
was bound to diminish opportunities for the ostracized minority.   Harlan was prescient in 
foreseeing that the separate but equal doctrine would not be limited to rail travel, but would 
expand to include many other aspects of meaningful activity.320
315
 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
316 Id. at  551-52 (“If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be 
the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary 
consent of individuals. . . . If the civil and political rights of both races be equal one cannot be 
inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the 
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane”). 
317 Id. at 543 (“‘It would be running the slavery argument into the ground,’ said Mr. 
Justice Bradley, ‘to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will . . . deal with in other matters 
of intercourse or business.’” (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25)).
318
 163 U.S. at 551. Only in 1954 did the Supreme Court find the “separate but equal” 
doctrine unconstitutional. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
319 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 555 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  On the importance of Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy to principled legal discourse see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
146 (1991) and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousnes , 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1076 (1991).
320
 Justice Harlan understood the wide-ranging implication of the holding: “If a state can 
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C. Modern Supreme Court Decisions 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, which the Court decided in 1968, went a long way to 
recognizing that congressional power to prevent the incidents of involuntary servitude extended 
well beyond hereditary forced labor.321 Jones implicitly overruled the Civil Rights Cases’s 
parochial view that Congress lacks the power to prevent exclusionary, racist practices. Jones
found that a federal law, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was “necessary and proper” for preventing 
private and public racial discrimination in real estate transactions.322 While the Court in Jones
did not directly overrule the social and civil dichotomy of the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy, it 
recognized that preventing people from living where they want because of their race was a 
demagogical practice associated with slavery.
The Court acknowledged Congress’s wide latitude to pass legislation to prevent civil 
rights violations: “Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to 
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that 
determination into effective legislation.”323 Congress can prevent state and private acts that 
encroach on fundamental rights. The Court’s refusal to address discrimination in public places 
was, however, disappointing since the Thirteenth Amendment is a more direct means of 
preventing private practices than resorting to the economic formulation of the Commerce 
prescribe, as a rule of civil conduct, that whites and blacks shall not travel as passengers in the 
same railroad coach, why may it not so regulate the use of the streets of its cities and towns as to 
compel white citizens to keep on one side of a street, and black citizens to keep on the other?” 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
321
 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding Congress’s power to prevent private housing 
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1982).
322 Id. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20) (“the Enabling Clause. . . . 
clothed ‘Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and 
incidents of slavery in the United States’”). The Court read section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 (42 U.S.C. §1982 (2002)), to prohibit private actors from discriminating against real 
property purchasers: “[T]he fact that §1982 operates upon the unofficial acts of private 
individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state law, presents no constitutional problem. If 
Congress has power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate conditions that prevent 
Negroes from buying and renting property because of their race or color, then no federal statute 
calculated to achieve that objective can be thought to exceed the constitutional power of 
Congress simply because it reaches beyond state action to regulate the conduct of private 
individuals.” Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39. For a survey of civil rights cases arising under 
nineteenth century statutes, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 see 
Note, Federal Power To Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement 
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 449, 466-505 (1974). 
323 Id. at 440.
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Cause.324 Moreover, Jones required courts to analyze human rights violations in a way 
significantly different from the state action analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment.325 The 
opinion shows a nascent understanding that slavery and its vestiges affected society as a whole 
and it makes some hesitant steps toward accepting the abolitionist perspective of freedom. The 
right to contract is treated as a natural right that private parties cannot trample.
In the Supreme Court cases that followed Jones, the Court continued holding that 
Congress can prohibit private racial discrimination pursuant to its section 2 Thirteenth 
Amendment power. The Court further broke down racial barriers that continued to inhibit 
freedom over a hundred years after the end of the Civil War.
The next landmark Thirteenth Amendment case, Runyon v. McCrary,326 reflected the 
Court’s willingness to extend the principle of liberty beyond the founders’ notions. Even though 
Runyon addressed the narrow issue of whether § 1981 prohibited private schools from refusing to 
enrol students based on their race, the Court’s holding had broad ramifications on the integration 
of private schools. The critical part of the statute provided that, “[A]ll persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State . . . to make and enforce 
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”327 Justice Steward for the majority determined the 
school violated interested parents’ contract rights because it used racial criteria to deny their 
children enrolment.328 The Court found that even though parents whose children attended the 
324
 On the distinction between congressional Commerce Clause and Thirteenth 
Amendment powers see infra text accompanying notes -------. Justice Steward, writing for the 
Court, however, expressly avoided reaching the issue of whether the Thirteenth Amendment 
granted Congress authority to prevent discrimination in places of public accommodations, 
finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had made that issue moot.  Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41, 
441 n.78 (“The Court did conclude in the Civil Rights Cases that ‘the act of . . . the owner of the 
inn, the public conveyance or place of amusement, refusing . . . accommodation’ cannot be 
‘justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant’ . . . . Whatever 
the present validity of the position taken by the majority on that issue--a question rendered 
largely academic by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964”).
325 See infra Part ----, distinguishing congressional Fourteenth and Thirteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.
326
 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
327 Id., at 160, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
328 Id. at 172-73 (“[i]t is apparent that the racial exclusion practiced by the Fairfax-
Brewster School and Bobbe's Private School amounts to a classic violation of § 1981. The 
parents . . . . sought to enter into contractual relationships with . . . for educational services. . . . 
Under those contractual relationships, the schools would have received payments for services 
rendered, and the prospective students would have received instruction in return for those 
payments. . . . But neither school offered services on equal basis to white and nonwhite 
students”). Justice White, writing for the dissent, argued that § 1981 could not be used to force 
people to enter into contracts, no matter what their motives were for refusing to do so. Id. at 194-
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school had the right not to associate with blacks in their private relations, their associational right 
could not legitimize school discrimination.
As favorable as the Court’s holding was for the desegregation of schools, it could have 
sent an even stronger message about the nation’s commitment to individual liberty and the 
general welfare. The Court should have used normative, rather than contractual, reasoning. It 
would have done better to understand the Thirteenth Amendment as a prohibition against 
arbitrary interference with parents’ educational decisions rather than simply their contractual 
rights. Constitutional liberation from slavery granted Congress the power to protect parental 
autonomy, which slave codes and individual slave masters had encroached.329 Parents’ 
fundamental right to educate their child is more compelling, and makes for more sympathetic 
plaintiffs, than does their commercial right to enter into a contract.
The use of history for interpreting the enforcement clause is also helpful in other 
associational cases. The Court found basis for congressional action in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Assn.330 Litigation in that case arose when a private swimming club refused to allow 
blacks to join as members or to visit as guests. Three adversely affected African Americans 
sought damages from the swimming club and asked the court to enjoin its practices. They raised 
their claims pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1982, both of which prohibit racist leasing and rental 
practices.331 Based on the dichotomy of rights in the Civil Rights Cases, it might have been 
95 (White, J., dissenting).          
329
 Mary Beth Norton et al., Afro -American Family in the Age of Revolution, in SLAVERY 
& FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 186-87 (Ira Berlin & Ronald Hoffman 
eds., 1983) (explaining that slavery compromised family integrity because masters could sell 
their slaves for economic, subduing, or whimsical reasons); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, BLACK 
FAMILY IN SLAVERY & FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 207-09 (1976) (concluding that, despite the risk 
of being forcefully separated by sale, slaves were able to develop cohesive family structures); 
Peter Kolchin, Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A Comparative Perspective, 70 J. 
AM. HIST. 579, 584 (1983) (discussing the difficulties faced by slaves who married the slaves of 
other owners). For more regional information about the slave family that has been developed 
since the 1980's see ANN PATTON MALONE, SWEET CHARIOT: SLAVE FAMILY & HOUSEHOLD 
STRUCTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA (1992); LARRY E. HUDSON JR., TO HAVE & TO 
HOLD: SLAVE WORK & FAMILY LIFE IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA (1997). After 1865, in an 
effort to retain slavery through legal ruse, several states instituted child apprenticeship laws. 
These statutes required children to serve for a term of indenture away from parents, so long as a 
white judge determined that such service was in the children’s best interest.  PETER KOLCHIN, 
AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877, at 220-21 (1993). These children apprenticeships, as Leon 
Litwack pointed out, amounted to legalized kidnaping and de facto slavery. BEEN IN THE STORM 
SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 191, 237-38 (1979).  
330
 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
331
 The Court found no need to examine whether §§ 1981 and 1982 applied to private 
discrimination, determining that it was sufficient that the “operative language” of both was 
“traceable” to section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 439-40.
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expected for the court to find the use of the swimming pool to be a social, rather than civil right, 
and to provide the Plaintiffs no relief. The Court, instead, decided §§ 1981 and 1982 prohibited 
the club from excluding people based on race. Part of the Plaintiffs’ valuation of the real estate 
purchases was based on their expectation to join the recreation center.332 The swimming club, 
which was a private party, interfered with the applicants’ right to enter into contract by denying 
them access to the public place of accommodation. Just as with Runyon, the holding in Tillman is 
too narrow, being grounded on contract principles rather than on the federal enforcement power 
to prevent acts of private racism resembling the incidents of servitude. All free people have the 
national citizenship right to freely partake of community amenities without the burden of racism. 
Prohibiting the use of racist associational standards is a legitimate aim of a post-Reconstruction 
Congress in its overall commitment to the general welfare.
The Court’s narrow construction of Thirteenth Amendment liberty, which has been partly 
constrained by the limited scopes of §§ 1981 and 1983, was nevertheless sufficient for finding 
that employment discrimination is analogous to involuntary servitude. In Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency333 the Court determined that section 1981 applies to private employers’ 
discrimination. The case provides a distinction between employment discrimination claims filed 
under § 1981 and Title VII, which is the traditional avenue of relief for employment 
discrimination. The Court’s holding illustrates why filing a cause of action under section § 1981 
is sometimes preferable to filing under Title VII.
Title VII’s statute of limitations is typically shorter than the filing period for § 1981.334
Section 1981 does not contain any statute of limitations, therefore courts apply the statute of 
limitations of analogous state statutes.335 In Johnson, the Court applied Tennessee’s one year 
limitation period,336 which was significantly longer than Title VII’s 180 day requirement to file 
the employment claim with the EEOC or 300 days to file with a state EEO. Other courts 
commonly apply two or three year state personal injury statutes of limitations to § 1981 cases 
332 Id. at 437.
333
 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
334
 Title VII ordinarily requires an aggrieved party to file a charge with the EEOC within 
180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice or 300 days after the unlawful practice if 
the aggrieved party files a discrimination complaint in a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(11) (2003). Filing a Title VII action with the EEOC does not tole the statute of limitations on § 
1981 claims. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465.
335
 There are a variety of recent decisions applying analogous state statutes of limitations 
to § 1981 claim sand thereby extending plaintiffs’ ability to recover for harassment occurring 
before the Title VII statutory 300-day deadline. See Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 
339 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 2003); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 330 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2003); Huckabay v. 
Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
336 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 462.
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thereby allowing claims to proceed that have been long barred by Title VII.337 Thereby, more 
employment discrimination claims can be judged on the merits instead of being dismissed on 
technicality grounds. Title VII’s timing provision is more protective of employer’s while § 1981 
is centered on providing injured parties with adequate time for redress. Congress passed Title VII 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority. That Clause permits Congress to pass statutes 
regulating behavior with a substantial effect on the national economy. Section 1981, on the other 
hand, was passed pursuant to Thirteenth Amendment authority, which permits Congress to 
regulate behavior that arbitrarily infringes the natural rights revolutionaries and abolitionists 
relied on. Two other advantages of a § 1981 claim are that it can include employers who are 
improper parties under Title VII338 and that § 1981 claims can be brought without having to first 
exhaust administrative remedies.339
An overview of case law decided since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer shows just how far the 
Thirteenth Amendment can reach, even when litigants rely on ancient civil rights statutes, in 
particular §§ 1981 and 1982, that are modeled after the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress can 
go much further than these, especially with the sensibility against discrimination that has 
burgeoned in the United States since the 1960's, by passing new statutes pursuant to its 
enforcement clause authority. Certainly discrimination in real estate transactions and private 
schools is not, in and of itself, literally slavery nor involuntary servitude; rather, the Court 
interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as granting Congress discretionary power to determine 
337 See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton County Georgia, 207 F.3d 1303, 1346 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(applying a two-year personal injury statute of limitations to both § 1981 and § 1983 claims); 
Rogers v. Barkin, 20 Fed.Appx. 630, 631, 2001 WL 1218413, at 1 (9th Cir.) (unpublished 
opinion) (finding that Nevada’s two year personal injury statute of limitations applied to § 1981 
claims); Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1514 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that based on 
damages awarded for a § 1981 claim were limited by the state’s two year personal injury statute). 
Some courts have also applied three year personal injury statues of limitations. See, e.g., King v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 356 (2d Cir. 2002); Carney v. American University
Excerpt, 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The Eleventh Circuit even found a four year 
statute of limitations applied to a § 1981 claim. Baker v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 850 F.2d 
1480, 1481 (11th Cir.1988).
338 Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460 (asserting that “[s]ection 1981 is not coextensive in its 
coverage with Title VII. The latter is made inapplicable to certain employers. 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b)”). The Supreme Court stated this matter more positively in a footnote to a 1994 case. 
See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 304 n.3 (1994) (“[e]ven in the employment 
context, § 1981's coverage is broader than Title VII's, for Title VII applies only to employers with 
15 or more employees, see 42 U.S.C. s 2000e(b), whereas § 1981 has no such limitation”). 
Likewise, in a concurring and dissenting opinion to Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (Patterson 
II), 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Justice Brennan wrote that “§ 1981 is not limited in scope to 
employment discrimination by businesses with 15 or more employees, cf. 42 U.S.C. s 2000e(b), 
and hence may reach the nearly 15% of the workforce not covered by Title VII.”
339 Johnson, 421 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1975).
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what forms of discrimination are rationally related to the incidents and badges of servitude. The 
Court’s analyses in Jones, Runyon, Tillman, and Johnson indicate that Congress can pass 
effective laws rationally designed to end any remaining incidents and badges of servitude.
VI. Constructive Liberty
Congress has rarely used the sweeping powers of the enforcement clause to protect civil 
rights. The Court has therefore rarely had to interpret the second section of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.
The congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866 
along with the handful of Supreme Court opinions on Reconstruction era statutes provide the 
best sources for developmental analysis. These sources indicate that the Amendment granted 
Congress the power to put into effect the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Preamble to the Constitution. Recent Rehnquist Court limitations on congressional Fourteenth 
Amendment and Commerce Clause power are inapplicable to the Constitution’s national 
assurance of freedom through the Thirteenth Amendment.
A. Thirteenth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Commerce Clause 
1. Fourteenth Amendment &Thirteenth Amendment 
The abolition of slavery was only meant to be Congress’s point of legislative departure. 
The Thirteenth Amendment provides Congress with the authority to pass any necessary and 
proper laws for securing citizens’ right to live uncoerced, self-directed lives.
The Fourteenth Amendment too secures normative values essential to living a good 
life,340 yet the state action requirement sets limits on its effectiveness that the Thirteenth 
Amendment does not impose. The Supreme Court has narrowly construed the applicability of the 
enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Civil Rights Cases.341 As to 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority, the Court has for over a century recognized that 
Congress has the power to prohibit private discrimination.342
340 See Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, & the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705, 706 (1998) (writing about the rationalist conception of human nature, 
considered to be characteristic of the liberty secured under the Fourteenth Amendment); Maureen 
B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW & INEQ. 381, 
422 (1994) (writing that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands for the 
promise of a good life).
341 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (holding that Congress only has the power to 
provide relief against state actions violating section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that 
section 5 does not grant Congress the power to enact laws affecting private rights). The Court has 
consistently maintained the state action requirement, stating in Morrison that it will not deviate 
from “the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits 
only state action.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621.
342
 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (finding that the Thirteenth Amendment 
prohibited state and private badges of servitude);  Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (prohibiting a 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
64
 The Thirteenth Amendment scheme is an even more unambiguous federal mandate than 
the Fourteenth Amendment for protecting liberty to achieve the common good. The prohibition 
against involuntary servitude is absolute, thus Congress can proscribe any incidents or badges of 
it. The Thirteenth Amendment vests Congress with the power to protect the unobtrusive exercise 
of freedom against arbitrary infringement. In at least some cases, such as those involving 
instances of peonage, not even a compelling state interest can justify a state or private 
infringement of autonomy.
On the other hand, where there is an overriding public interest, the state may infringe on 
the personal liberties otherwise secured under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, 
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, carved out this Fourteenth Amendment exception 
to the usual prohibition against the use of race, alienage, and national origin classifications. Such 
laws “are subjected to strict scrutiny” analysis and will only be found constitutional if they “serve 
a compelling state interest.”343 The Court later clarified that governmental restraints on 
fundamental freedoms must be “specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish” the compelling 
purpose.344 Such a restrictive law cannot be “merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of 
a permissible state policy.”345 From the Fourteenth Amendment perspective, even fundamental 
liberty interests can be abridged for compelling public reasons.346
From the Thirteenth Amendment side, Congress can only place curbs on liberties when 
their exercise would diminish the general welfare. We can infer that general welfare is not treated 
aggregately since the Amendment clearly prohibits the enslavement of a minority for the 
increased benefit of the majority. The enslavement of even one person diminishes the overall
welfare, at least by a denominator of one, and the Thirteenth Amendment does not allow for the 
exploitation of even one person for the benefit of others.
Recent Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence further highlights the limiting factors on 
Congress’s power under it and on the non-applicability of those factors to the enforcement clause 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court has adopted the “responsive,” rather than a pro-active, 
reading of congressional section 5 powers. In City of Boerne v. Flores,347 the Court invalidated 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, in part, because it found the statute “so out of proportion 
to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or 
private school from discriminating against parents who wanted to enroll their children); Jones, 
392 U.S. at 439-40 (1968) (affirming the Civil Rights Cases finding that the Thirteenth 
Amendment bans all "badges and incidents of [servitude]");
343
 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
344
 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986). See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U.S. 899, 908 (1996).
345
 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
346
 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
347
 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior.”348 The case limited Congress’s section 5 powers 
to passing congruent laws for remedying state violations of Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees:349 The Court reiterated this “responsive” interpretation in Kimel v. Florida Board of 
Regents,350 in finding that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress 
to extend the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to states. 
Laws passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment may also be responsive to 
discrimination, but their purpose can be more pro-active. Pursuant to it, the standard for passing 
“effective legislation” is that it be “rationally” related to “the badges and the incidents of 
servitude.”351 Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the federal legislature may, and indeed should, 
pass laws that are conducive for autonomy to thrive. My point is that Congress may use its 
section 2 power to pass laws that protect the non-intrusive use of personal freedom and punish its 
abridgment. Moreover, Congress may pass civil legislation, more sensitive to human rights 
concerns than §§ 1981 and 1982, allowing for private compensation even where contractual 
rights have not been abridged. Congress’s enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
not only aims to prevent interference with fundamental rights, which is the extent of Congress’s 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment,352 it also enables the federal government to 
instantiate the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble. Debates on the 
substance of liberty should be dynamic and based on the United States’s continued sensitivity to 
the rights of minorities rather than exclusively confined to the Amendment’s framer’s precise 
definitions of liberty. Yet their understandings are part of the narrative that provides continuing 
legislative value to the Thirteenth Amendment.
348 Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
349 Id. at 520.
350
 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
351 Jones, 392 U.S. at 440.
352 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”). The Court first connected governmental interference with the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), finding that it only 
protected citizens from state interference with the privileges and immunities of national, but not 
state, citizenship. Id. at 61-62. Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause prevents the interference 
with the exercise of fundamental rights “unless it is supported by sufficiently important state 
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has a substantive 
component that ‘provides heightened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests’” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 57 (2000), quoting
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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Since the Slaughterhouse Cases, Civil Rights Cases, and United States v. Harris the 
Court has severely handicapped national power in the area of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the 
Thirteenth Amendment remains available for legislative actions augmenting freedom, not merely 
barring interference with it. The schema I propose authorizes Congress to pass laws that allow 
people to freely choose their pursuits so long as they do not arbitrarily interfere with the coequal 
rights of others. This schema is both a positive grant of freedom, in so far as it recognizes that 
freedom is a substantive right that the Thirteenth Amendment assures, and a negative right the 
Thirteenth Amendment prevents from being infringed. Such a perspective makes more obvious 
Congress’s authority to pass laws assuring women’s rights by preventing violence or enabling 
older and disabled workers the right to pursue their avocations without state or private intrusion.
2. Commerce Clause & Thirteenth Amendment 
The Rehnquist Court has constricted congressional power to pass civil right laws pursuant 
to the Commerce Clause just as it limited Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority. Prior to 
1997, Congress has virtually plenary power to pass laws that were rationally related to the 
national economy.353
This trend, which began during the New Deal, crescendoed during the 1960's when 
Congress passed a series of civil rights statutes, most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause authority.354 Congress’s aim, in part, was to adopt creative 
strategies for getting around the eighty-year-old state action restrictions in United States v. 
Harris355 and the Civil Rights Cases.356 Civil rights leaders, too, recognized that private acts of 
discrimination violated the individual right of self -determination and wanted the federal 
government to provide a remedy against private actors.357 The Supreme Court, under the 
353 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118-29 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938 because family farm consumption had a cumulative effect on the 
national wheat market). Lopez did not overrule Wickard, but called it “the most far reaching 
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.” United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
354
 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in various sections of titles 28 
and 42 of the United States Code).
355
 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act, 
ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, which punished private conspiracies).
356
 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883) (holding that Congress’s Fourteenth 
Amendment section 5 enforcement powers are limited to state action); see also Virginia v. Rives, 
100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment provisions “all have reference 
to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals”).
357
 Even though many, including the Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and 
constitutional scholars, like Gerald Gunther, counseled to use the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, understood that without overruling the Civil Rights Cases such 
a suggestion was a nonstarter. Seth P. Waxman, Twins At Birth: Civil Rights & the Role of the 
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leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, turned to the Commerce Clause for justifying the use of 
congressional power to enact laws against private discrimination rather than overturning the post-
Reconstruction jurisprudence that established Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment authority.
The Court found Congress could constitutionally prohibit discrimination by private 
providers who engage in an industry affecting interstate commerce. A 1964 watershed case, 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, determined Congress could prevent a motel from interfering with the 
interstate travel of black patrons wanting to rent a room there.358 Without investigating the extent 
of congressional findings, the Court determined the Senate and House had made a rational use of 
overwhelming evidence that hotels and motels were obstructing interstate commerce.359 That 
same year, the Court found in Katzenbach v. McClung that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
constitutionally prohibits a family-owned restaurant from discriminating against potential 
patrons. In the latter case, the Court explicitly stated that Congress was not required to make any 
formal findings as to the economic effect of legislation passed pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause.360
For decades, Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung stood for the deferential principle that 
Congress could pass any necessary laws rationally connected to interstate commerce. The Court 
did not secondguess congressional factfinding when a statute met this minimum threshold.361 So 
long as the legislature did not pass a law based on arbitrary and concocted findings, the Court 
time and again found statutes constitutional. Prior to 1997, as Harold J. Krent pointed out, the 
Court did not categorically require that all legislation with constitutional implications be 
supported by legislative findings. Such a requirement, Krent went on to say “unquestionably 
would fundamentally alter the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.”362
Solicitor General, 75 Ind. L.J. 1297, 1312 (2000). Since stare decisis indicated that the 
likelihood of overruling the 1883 decision was small, Cox convinced the President to follow the 
Commerce Clause strategy.
358
 The Court found that Heart of Atlanta Motel was engaged in interstate commerce 
since it advertised nationally and attracted part of its business from persons using interstate 
highways. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 243.
359 Id. at 257.
360
 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964).
361
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 666 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[t]his 
Court has not previously held that Congress must document the existence of a problem in  every 
State prior to proposing a national solution”).
362
 Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring 
Legislative Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 732-33 (1996). For an earlier rendition of 
the same point see Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional  Adjudication and the Promotion of 
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966)  (“The Court does not review the sufficiency of 
the evidence in the record to support congressional action. . . . No case has ever held that a record 
is constitutionally required.”).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
68
By the 1990's, use of the Commerce Clause was a well established civil rights strategy; 
however, the Court altered the dynamic of judicial review in United States v. Morrison, where it 
struck down a national law prohibiting gender motivated violence, and United States v. Lopez, 
where it found unconstitutional a federal statute against the possession of firearms near a 
school.363 In the name of federalism, the Court increased its oversight of the legislative 
process.364
Beginning with Lopez, the Court weakened Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
Rather than using the rational basis test, the Court determined that the Gun Free School Zones 
Act was unconstitutional since it sought to prevent an activity that did not have a “substantial 
effect” on interstate commerce. Unlike Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung, the Court second-
guessed policymakers in finding that lawmakers had not made an adequate showing that guns 
carried near schools were connected to an “economic enterprise.”365 Justice Breyer, writing in 
dissent, found no basis for deviating from the rational basis test, meaning that Congress should 
be able to regulate any activity “significantly (or substantially)” affecting national commerce.366
The Chief Justice, who wrote the majority opinion in Lopez, also spoke for the Court in 
Morrison. Unlike the congressional record on the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Congress had 
provided abundant information about the interstate effects of gender-violence, but the Court did 
not find sufficient evidence to prove that violence against women substantially affected interstate 
commerce. The legislative history revealed a “mountain of data,” including information from no 
less than nine congressional hearings and reports from gender bias task forces in twenty-one 
states, which were amassed over four years.367
363
 In similar fashion, the Court encroached on Congress’s section 5 Fourteenth 
Amendment authority both in Morrison and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000).
364
 A. Christopher Bryant and Timothy J. Simeone have canvassed Supreme Court 
precedents and found that the Court’s recent trend of striking laws because of a purportedly 
inadequate congressional record “is highly questionable on precedential, constitutional, and 
practical grounds.” Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New “On the Record” 
Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 389 (2001).
365 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-61.
366 Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer pointed out that, contrary to the majority’s 
holding, Commerce Clause cases have not consistently used the “substantial effects” label: “I use 
the word ‘significant’ because the word ‘substantial’ implies a somewhat narrower power than 
recent precedent suggests . . . . But to speak of ‘substantial effect’ rather than ‘significant effect’ 
would make no difference in this case.” Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting). From a different 
perspective, Justice Thomas considered the substantial effects text to be a virtually limitless grant 
of congressional power: “We must . . . respect a constitutional line that does not grant Congress 
power over all that substantially affects interstate commerce.” Id. at 593 (Thomas, J., 
concurring).
367
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-31 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Court disregarded the compiled data because it found that violent gender motivated 
crimes “are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”368 This, itself, seems to be a 
return to judicial scrutiny reminiscent of Lochner era substantive due process review.369 To 
further curtail congressional overreaching, the Court concluded that Congress could not enact 
laws “based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” The aggregation 
doctrine, the Court held, was inapplicable in cases of gender-motivated violence “not directed at 
the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the 
province of the States.”370
All told, the recent developments in Commerce Clause cases illustrate the chief problem 
with relying on that part of the Constitution to support Congress’s power to end arbitrary 
intolerance. That strategy leaves open economic counterarguments about a lack of substantial 
connection between an intolerant act and interstate commerce. But federal laws relying on the 
Thirteenth Amendment need only be rationally related to the vestiges of slavocracy, not to the 
national economy.
The Court’s determination that misogynistic violence has no substantial effect on national 
commerce is irrelevant in evaluating whether the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the 
power to prevent such violence. The Jones rational basis inquiry has never been altered the way 
the Lopez and Morrison altered the Commerce Clause analysis. Had Congress relied on its 
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in passing the VAWA, the Court would have had to 
defer to legislators as long as they had found that gender-motivated violence is rationally related 
to the incidents of servitude and that the statute was a necessary and proper means of dealing 
with it. The only question left for the Court would have been whether the statutory means chosen 
by Congress were “reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.”371
The Commerce Clause is a morally neutral provision that could just as readily be used in 
a slave society as in a liberal republic. Its history bears this out. Even though by 1824 the Court, 
in Gibbons v. Ogden,372 determined that Congress has the power to regulate any commerce 
between states, slavery continued unabated and exploited commercial outlets. There is even 
368
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 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“in the minds of the majority there 
is a new animating theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful again. Just as the old 
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conception of federalism”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(“[t]he resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era's industrial due 
process is striking."); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165-69 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (comparing recent Supreme Court federalist approaches to Lochner).
370
 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
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indication from debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention that the Commerce Clause
was part of founders’ compromise with the slave states.373 Even though the Clause presumably 
granted Congress the power to regulate the slave trade between states, the national government 
tolerated the practice, and some antebellum congressmen owned slaves.374
By its very terms, the Thirteenth Amendment is not given to a neutral reading on the 
subject of private or state sponsored discrimination; indeed, it gives the federal legislature the 
power to enforce the liberty guarantees of the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the 
Constitution. Further, the Thirteenth Amendment extends to interstate and intrastate activities, 
regardless of whether they have any effect on commerce. The Amendment grants Congress the 
legal authority to prohibit arbitrary restriction of freedom, regardless of their impact on the 
economy. This does not mean that a Thirteenth Amendment civil rights approach should displace 
Commerce Clause efforts under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, I mean to stress the 
continued vitality of Jones in establishing Congress’s broad interpretive power, at a time when 
the Court in Lopez and Morrison has made the passage of new civil rights legislation under 
Commerce Clause more onerous.
B. Construing Thirteenth Amendment Liberty 
Judicial opinion is only a factor in formulating a constructive interpretation of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. Even the ideas of the Amendment’s framers, while invaluable, cannot be 
the endpoint of construction since its framers were men of their times whose social and political 
backgrounds made them incapable of foreseeing every potential application to the amendment 
they passed. Their ideas and those of their abolitionist mentors are nevertheless invaluable in 
comprehending the Amendment’s significance to contemporary incidents of involuntary 
servitude such as the forced sex trade, the exploitation of domestic workers, and the peonage of 
migrant farmers.375 Historic examination, when supplemented with normative analysis, is useful 
for defining constitutional limitations of congressional power.376
373 PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 24 
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The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the enforcement power 
to effectuate the moral principles of the Preamble to the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence. In this regard, the Thirteenth Amendment was both a new beginning for the nation 
and a constructive means for enforcing its foundational principles of liberty and general well-
being.
The Thirteenth Amendment was a drastic brake from the clauses of the 1787 Constitution 
that protected slavery.377 Section 2 expanded the federal government’s ability to protect 
individuals by granting Congress the power to protect civil liberties, rather than relying on states 
to do so. The Thirteenth Amendment is the bridge between a constitution beholden to the 
aristocratic practices of slavocracy and one beholden to coequal liberty. The Thirteenth 
Amendment, thereby, secured the Preamble’s principled grant of governmental power. The 
Amendment protects the right to unobtrusive autonomy for carrying out deliberative decision, 
limiting autonomy whenever it arbitrary interfere’s with the reasonable purposes of other 
citizens. The assurance of freedom protects dignity rights as long as they do not infringe on the 
equal liberty rights of others. This approach balances autonomy with welfare to achieve a 
liberating sense of mutual purpose for congressional initiative.
The second section of the Thirteenth Amendment provided an enforceable national 
guarantee of freedom that is not subject to state prerogative. Federal legislative power is 
available against any form of arbitrary domination. The scheme protects more than the freedoms 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights and extends to any intrinsic freedom, such as the ability to freely 
travel between states. Fair civil rights initiatives must balance individual liberties against the 
national interests of a diverse but equally free people. The enforcement clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment provides lawmakers with the power to craft laws that are tied to the Declaration of 
Independence’s vision of a free and equal citizenry. The framers of the Thirteenth Amendment 
determined that liberty was a national right and provided the federal government the 
constitutional authority to secure it against all racist discrimination.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has extended the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
applicability to coercive acts committed against members of any race, not only against blacks. In 
the years following the Amendment’s ratification, Radical Republicans passed civil rights 
legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, to protect 
their black and white allies. The risk to missionaries, teachers, and politicians who came to the 
South after the Civil War was almost as great as the danger blacks faced from mob violence.378
Since then a variety of cases have defined who can bring suit under legislation promulgated 
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court held that the 
377 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 139 (1988) (“the conflict of 1861, 
among other things, divides our constitutional history, and some historians refer to the ‘first’ and 
‘second’ Constitutions. The first Constitution–that of 1787–was predicated, among other things, 
on federalism and recognition of slavery, and the second Constitution, on an enhanced national 
government and individual liberty”).
378 See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism In the Era of the Civil 
War & Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 878 (1986) (stating that postbellum civil rights 
legislation was intended to protect blacks and whites). 
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Amendment applies to “Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie labor system.” Even though 
race is a fluid term, the Supreme Court later held that contemporary racial classifications should 
not constrict the Amendment’s applicability. In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, a 1987 case 
arising from the private desecration of a synagogue, the Court found that when the 1866 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Jews and Arabs were among the groups classified 
as distinct races. The Court, therefore, conclude that the Civil Rights Act prevents property 
discrimination reminiscent of servitude from being committed against Jews and Arabs..379
 The Amendment’s protections apply to anyone who is subject to arbitrary restraints 
against the enjoyment of freedom. The Abolition Amendment freed slaves from much more than 
their obligation to engage in unrequited labor. It ended all incidents of servitude such as the 
forced limitations on slaves’ right to practice religion, hire out their labor, and leave their 
plantations without permission.380 The Thirteenth Amendment, inferentially, prohibits all 
repressive conduct rationally related to the impediments of freedom, not simply racist labor 
practices. Congress can act against any restraint on liberty resembling the badges and incidents of 
involuntary servitude.
Statutes should protect free and equal persons’ right to pursue qualitatively good lives. 
Masters had suppressed slaves’ life aspirations, prohibiting them from entering into marital 
contracts, from choosing professions, and from making a host of other important life decisions. 
Slavery devalued the Preamble’s governmental commitment to respect the right of citizens to be 
free of arbitrary intrusions on their freedom. Consequently, laws that are passed under section 2 
must make it easier for people to express their individuality and prevent arbitrarily domineering, 
private and state actions.
 As is already clear, I accept as axiomatic that persons have the right to live as happy, 
autonomous agents within a diverse polity. The Thirteenth Amendment requires that the federal 
legislature and the judiciary provide the security necessary for citizens to direct their lives 
pursuant to unique plans, relationships, and interests. Slavery denies persons the opportunity to 
creatively engage with the world by restricting their right to pursue professions, choose how to 
raise their children, and make reasonable choices between an infinite variety of domestic options. 
A free society allows persons to make plans about their lives rather than externally necessitating 
them to act on undesired alternatives. Becoming a carpenter because of an interest in the craft is 
significantly different from having no option but to chose that trade. Teaching ones own children 
only English differs from being prohibited from teaching them foreign languages. Living in a 
predominantly Jewish neighborhood by choice is different, under the Thirteenth Amendment, 
than being foreclosed from living elsewhere.
The Thirteenth Amendment shifts the balance of authority for protecting these civil rights 
away from states and in favor of the national government. A federal polity must protect 
individual opportunities to pursue self-defined goals and establish reciprocal rights for fair 
379
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dealing. One of the federal government’s primary functions is to protect the common good; that 
is, laws must aim to pragmatically improve people’s lives and to help them flourish as self-
directed individuals.
This reasoning presupposes that the coequal freedom of self-determination and self-
realization is conducive to the overall good of U.S. society. Laws that require citizens to deal 
fairly can reduce individual conflicts and, thereby, increase social tranquility. So, a policy 
designed to promote liberty as a means of achieving the common good has an anti-discriminatory 
principle built into it: One cannot arbitrarily restrict another’s liberty through the badges or 
incidents of servitude and credulously insist that such an act benefits everyone.
Civil liberties are not absolute; rather, they may be limited by the coequal rights of others. 
People living in an organized society may not exercise their liberty to intentionally cause more 
than a trivial amount of harm to others. The Amendment is not a right for license but rather for 
independence of choice. It does not sanction indiscriminate behavior that disregards the rights of 
others. Instead, it provides national assurance of legal redress against arbitrary constraints on 
independent and unobtrusive choices.381 The Thirteenth Amendment prevents the use of liberty 
to interfere with other people’s quest for a good life. This constraint on the Amendment’s 
significance derives from slavers’ abuse of freedom. After all, masters had abused their property 
right to possess and sell slaves. The Amendment ended this atomistic and domineering 
perspective of constitutional liberty because its implementation denied the Declaration’s and 
Preamble’s assurances to a host of persons for whom the drive for a good life was just as 
fundamental as it was for their tormentors. The Amendment was meant to counteract that abuse 
of power by enabling Congress to prohibit any abridgments on people’s rights to be self-directed 
and self-motivated. I draw this conclusion not only from the theoretical construct of liberty but 
from the denigrating nature of the master servant relationship.
Laws based on the Thirteenth Amendment should safeguard the right of citizens to live 
meaningful lives that are unobstructed by acts of arbitrary domination. In drafting civil rights 
bills, legislators should assess whether the United States has eliminated all vestiges of 
involuntary servitude. With those vestiges that remain, Congress must pass enforcement laws 
designed to end them.
Federal laws against such practices should be drafted to best benefit the entire populace, 
rather than a particular interest group.382 The nation rises or falls as a whole. The Thirteenth 
Amendment made available to all the full enjoyment of the rights essential to a free society. It 
does not take for granted that each person will act with reciprocal concern and respect for fellow 
citizens. Instead, the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enact laws against 
arbitrary domination. By securing personal safety and stability, the Amendment protects the 
nation’s citizenry against whimsical coercion. Judicial review serves to check congressional 
power from being hijacked for autocratic purposes.
381
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Congress has thus far done little to fulfill its legislative obligation to liberty rights under 
the Thirteenth Amendment, and only a handful of cases interpret congressional power. 
Congress’s failure to act has reduced the Amendment’s effectiveness but not its enormous 
potential for civil change. In spite of more than a century of virtual neglect, the congressional 
authority to pass a variety of civil rights laws remains viably intact.
Conclusion
The enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to 
provide for the general welfare by protecting civil liberties. The ideology of revolutionary 
founders and abolitionists had a profound effect on the Amendment’s proponents. Abolitionist 
perspectives about the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble influenced Radical 
Republicans in their decision to pass a comprehensive amendment for the national protection of 
liberty. For the Amendment’s framers, the concept of slavery and its concomitant harms was as 
broad as that notion was for revolutionaries and abolitionists.
The Reconstruction Congress developed the Thirteenth Amendment to be a far-reaching 
guaranty of any fundamental right essential to human liberty. Section 2 of the Thirteenth 
Amendment was included to provide legislators with the means for implementing protections of 
fundamental liberties such as the right to travel and the right to marry. Today section 2 still 
empowers Congress to reflect on contemporary conditions that are analogous to involuntary 
servitude and slavery and to pass federal legislation for their end.
In the years following the Civil War, the Supreme Court rejected the comprehensive 
reading of liberty in favor for a narrow understanding of it that was more closely linked to the 
Amendment’s opponents than to its supporters.383 After years of narrow construction, the Court 
realized that the Amendment grants Congress the right to prevent many obstructions to freedom, 
such as discriminatory contractual practices, that are not literally connected to force labor.
The Thirteenth Amendment’s national guarantee of freedom remains an alternative for 
passing civil rights legislation. That alternative has taken on greater import since the Court 
recently reduced congressional effectiveness under the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress’s primary focus under the Thirteenth Amendment is achieving 
coequal liberty, not the national economy. To achieve that end, the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement clause authorizes Congress to pass statutes against private and public 
discrimination, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment.
383 See Pamela Brandwein, Slavery as an Interpretive Issue in the Reconstruction 
Congress, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 315, 316, 354 (2000) (analyzing Northern Democratic view, 
expressed during the 1864 and 1865 debates, for a limited reading of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and linking it to later Supreme Court opinions).
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